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“There are some kinds of uncertainty that are, to an extent, 
within the developer’s control. They can be identified, 
measured, and contained. Others are more difficult to 
control and to a large extent have to be accepted as part of 
the development risk.  One such element of uncertainty is 
that of time. Property development is a dynamic process 
and time runs through it as a constant source of 
uncertainty.” 
(Byrne, 1996, p. 5) 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The following report details the current state of the Planned Unit Development 
(PUD) regulations and procedures in Washington, DC.  Based on interviews with 
planners, community leaders, land use attorneys, architects, and developers with 
extensive experience working on PUDs, the report answers the questions: how are the 
regulations and the processes currently working, and what are their specific strengths and 
weaknesses?   
The report finds that the process’s overarching shortcoming is its uncertainty: 
developers seldom know how long the process will take, or what the final required 
proffer to the community will be.  The large variation between proffer packages and the 
variation of timing is caused, in large part, by the fact that communities do not know how 
to get involved in the PUD process, and are unsure about the breadth and scope of their 
allowed involvement.  This variability of outcomes makes it challenging for developers 
to embark upon new PUD projects, since the more closely they can model expected 
outcomes, the more carefully they can manage the inherent risk involved in undertaking 
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PUDs, and vice versa.  In addition to making the process difficult for developers, the 
discrepancies between final PUD proffer packages may seem inequitable to communities, 
many of which may feel unfairly treated when they receive far less in a PUD negotiation 
than another neighborhood or community.   
In light of these findings, this report recommends a number of ways to improve 
DC’s PUD process; these recommendations are a menu of options from which the city 
can pick and choose to meet its goals.  First, the city could much more clearly state the 
rules and timing of engagement between communities and developers.  Second, once the 
process is more clearly defined, DCOP could actively educate communities about how 
the process works and how they can get involved productively.  The city could conduct 
training sessions with ANC members and other community leaders.  Third, DCOP could 
act as a facilitator for communities, helping guide them through their role in the PUD 
process.  Fourth, DCOP (or some other third party) could act as a mediator in all 
interactions between the communities and the developers.  This third party’s role would 
be to keep the process organized and equitable, and to act as a referee, or an objective 
“truth-teller.”  Fifth, communities could create their own inventories of needed 
improvements, before any PUDs are begun, so that developers could base their initial 
proffers off of those lists of needed items.  Sixth, it is possible to shorten other aspects of 
the process —outside the community-developer interaction—that delay it unnecessarily. 
Implementation of these recommendations will help the city improve its PUD 
process, but it is important to note that these solutions represent simply tinkering around 
the edges.  Instead of this tinkering, I recommend that DC radically re-think its PUDs, 
recognizing that it uses PUDs a type of super-variance, or incentive zoning, instead of 
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consistently with other cities’ use of PUDs.  There are many options for radically re-
thinking PUDs in DC, including eliminating the PUD regulations and process entirely; 
making actual zoning match the city’s desired development patterns, rather than forcing 
developers to apply for variances to meet those desires; making only very large tracts of 
land eligible for the PUD process; and establishing two separate processes for PUDs of 
varying sizes.  DC’s top policy-makers must ultimately decide upon the direction in 
which they will take the city’s PUDs—whether tinkering with the process to address its 
shortcomings, or altering it dramatically to address its fundamental purpose and structure.  
No matter its course of action, the city should shape its decision with input from the 
community, in a way that accounts for the political climate and economic feasibility of 
each option, and that always keeps the best interests of the public at the fore.  
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INTRODUCTION  
This report examines the Planned Unit Development (PUD) regulations and 
processes in Washington, DC.  It seeks to uncover the actual step-by-step experience of 
the process for each party involved, as well as the process’s strengths and weaknesses.  In 
addition, it attempts to understand the existing relationships between developers, planners 
for the DC Office of Planning (DCOP), architects and lawyers who work on PUD 
projects, and the community leaders called Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) 
members.   
One might imagine that the PUD regulations and process would be clearly laid 
out and defined, and that there would be little room for interpretation, confusion, or 
criticism.  This is, however, not the case.  Indeed, in the years preceding this report, 
DCOP has received numerous complaints about the PUD process from developers, ANC 
members, and citizens alike, each asserting that the process seemed unfair, poorly 
organized, overly complicated, and ineffective.  Some involved in the process maintained 
that the regulations were overly restrictive, while others called them too vague.  Others 
emphasized that there seemed to be little consistency between PUD project outcomes.   
Similarly, DCOP planners had noted that some neighborhoods had successfully 
negotiated for numerous amenities in exchange for the granting of a PUD, whereas other 
neighborhoods had received nothing in return for a developer’s PUD approval.  Many at 
the Office of Planning wondered if these concerns were valid and substantiated, and, if 
so, how the underlying causes of these issues could be addressed.  Overall, DCOP was 
eager to learn what the experience of going through the PUD process was like for each 
party involved, so that it could ultimately improve that process for all parties involved. 
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 Posing and answering these fundamental questions is valuable to the city for a 
multitude of reasons.  First and foremost, any city agency is, in many ways, a service 
organization, responsible for listening to and responding to its customers—citizens and 
businesses.  If these “customers” of public government complain about a process, the city 
is obliged to examine the validity of their complaints, and to make adjustments and 
improvements as needed.  In this case, recommendations for the city to improve upon the 
process in response to these public concerns can be found in the second half of this 
report. 
Secondly, cataloging the process in such depth will allow the city to increase 
transparency for all those who have a stake in PUDs and neighborhood change.  In any 
ongoing process, each party may only see his own slice of it, and may not know what the 
experience entails for the other parties involved.  Bringing DC’s PUD process’s steps into 
the light is not only the necessary reaction to the complaints of the city’s “customers,” but 
also it makes known to each party what the other is experiencing.  In that way, also, the 
process can be made more fair, as well as more efficient. 
 Beyond the particulars of this case and this city, many cities struggle with how to 
incorporate feedback from their communities equitably, efficiently, and reasonably into 
the development process.  In most development scenarios, there is a fundamental struggle 
over the balance of power between developers, the city, and the public as to who should 
have the right to impose its will upon the other groups, and how much formal input each 
group should be allowed.  This report examines one case of that balance of power, and 
offers guidance for ways in which the needs of all parties can be most equitably and 
efficiently met.  These suggestions can be taken beyond the city itself, and incorporated 
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into any city planning process in which an active, open negotiation between developers 
and communities is required or desired. 
Finally, this report seeks to understand the PUD regulations and process as part of 
a larger question about risk, an unavoidable component of any real estate development 
project.  Without risk of delay or increased expense, for example, practically anyone 
could be a successful real estate developer.  According to this project’s findings, 
navigating a PUD process creates enormous additional risks for real estate developers: 
namely the risk that the project will take much longer than anticipated, and that it will 
cost far more than was budgeted.  The report lays out a number of ways in which 
developers can address and mitigate those risks, as well as ways in which the city itself 
can reduce those risks through its regulation and guidance.  These recommendations 
should improve DC’s PUD process for developers and the public.  More importantly, 
these recommendations should be helpful for any city attempting to open the channels for 
the efficient flow of private capital, while concurrently upholding the best interests of the 
public. 
 
Methodology 
As stated above, the majority of this report was created at the behest of the 
Washington DC Office of Planning (DCOP), over the course of the summer of 2007.  
The new 2006 Comprehensive Plan for the City of Washington, DC had mandated that 
DCOP provide a thorough examination of the PUD regulations and processes, about 
which it had received many complaints over the years.   
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In order to meet that mandate, I first examined the city’s zoning regulations, to 
understand how the PUD regulations and processes were officially laid out and to 
understand what information may have been lacking in those regulations.  I also drew on 
a number of academic and research sources to understand the broader nature of PUDs 
throughout the country, so that I might further understand best practices, as well as be 
able to compare DC’s use of its regulations to other cities.  Third, I conducted interviews 
with twenty-six individuals—twenty-two in person, and four via phone.  The twenty-two 
included ten DCOP planners; four land use attorneys with experience representing clients 
going through the PUD process; one DC-based land use expert working with a legal firm 
on PUDs; three DC-based architects who have designed PUD projects; three Area 
Neighborhood Commission (ANC) Commissioners whose communities have faced 
PUDs, and three DC-based developers who have gone through the PUD process.  Phone 
interviews regarding PUDs were conducted with planners from Alexandria, VA; 
Arlington, VA; Baltimore, MD; and Boston, MA.  These were selected as comparable 
size cities, and competitors to Washington, DC.   
The purpose of each in-person interview was to determine the nature of the PUD 
experience—namely, what the process entails, and the challenges individuals and 
organizations face in going through it.  The interviews were also meant to tease out 
exactly what the purpose of PUD regulations should be, and whether or not the PUD 
regulations—in their current state—were achieving that purpose.  The following paper 
presents the majority of the results of that research, as well as an examination of how 
DC’s PUD regulations and processes provide an example of risk and uncertainty in the 
development process. 
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What are PUDs? 
Planned Unit Developments (PUDs) are both a process and the physical project that 
emerges from that process.  The phrase is also used informally to refer to the PUD 
ordinances or provisions that describe the process and projects that result from it.  
According to the American Planning Association (APA)’s PAS 545 Report, Planned Unit 
Developments, jurisdictions around the country think of and use the PUD concept in a 
number of different ways, most of which are quite different from DC’s use of the 
concept.  The different types of developments that PAS 545 qualifies as PUDs or master-
planned communities are: 
1) Single family residential density transfer, or cluster, developments, with no 
increase in density. 
2) Single-family residential development with an increase in density. 
3) Multi-family residential development with or without single-family residential 
development, and with or without an increase in density. 
4) Single-use nonresidential development, such as office, commercial, or industrial 
development. 
5) Nonresidential uses combined with residential uses, either single-family, multi-
family, or both, with or without a change in density. 
a. Infill development 
b. New development 
6) Master-planned community. (PAS 545, p. 20). 
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On this extensive list, only number 5a (infill development) comes closest to 
describing PUDs in the District of Columbia.  Some DC PUDs may also fall into 
categories 3 and 4, but those are far less common.  DC PUDs very rarely fall into 
categories 1, 2, and 6 (single-family residential development and large-scale, master-
planned communities).   
Most jurisdictions around the country, in sharp contrast to DC, use PUDs as a 
designation for large-scale, master-planned communities, often built on greenfield sites.  
These developments are primarily residential, but may also include centralized nodes of 
retail or business.  These kinds of PUDs are meant to “encourage flexibility, innovation 
of design, and a variety of development types that will improve the quality of physical 
development over that normally achieved through the application of the City’s standard 
single use zones” (Colorado Springs, CO).    
Essentially, these regulations allow applicants to develop a large-scale tract of land as 
a single entity, without having to adhere to the zoning constraints of each individual plot.  
PUD regulations like these might allow, for example, a developer to cluster all the houses 
of a development on one hundred acres of a five hundred acre parcel, rather than 
spreading the houses evenly across the five hundred acres as might be mandated by local 
low-density zoning regulations.  By clustering development, the project could conserve 
open and green spaces, which are valuable amenities to the new development and its 
residents, to the community at large, and to the environment.   
The community benefits from a more environmentally responsible, more cohesively 
planned development, in exchange for allowing the developer to stray from the city’s 
traditional (and often limiting) zoning regulations.  Some jurisdictions allow developers 
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more density and more height than would be allowed by matter-of-right, but most simply 
allow developers to shuffle matter-of-right height and density within a single site, so that 
better open space and other public amenities might be provided without increasing the 
project’s overall density. 
The language describing the purpose of DC’s PUDs may seem similar to that of 
Colorado Springs, above: “the overall goal is to permit flexibility of development and 
other incentives, such as increased building height and density; provided that the project 
offers a commendable number or quality of public benefits and that it protects and 
advances the public health, safety, welfare, and convenience”  (Chapter 24, Title 11). 
Nearly everyone interviewed regarding DC PUDs described the purpose of the PUDs in 
similar language, as well.  Most said that PUDs were meant to allow for flexibility of 
zoning (especially height and density) so that higher quality development projects could 
be built.  They are also meant to provide for a mix of land uses, to avoid the segregation 
of housing from retail, employment, or education. 
In DC, however, this language carries a different meaning than it does in most other 
jurisdictions.  Elsewhere, PUDs are often large tracts of land that are to be developed as a 
cohesive neighborhood.  In DC, PUDs may be these large-scale developments, but they 
also include smaller-scale, mixed-use development projects, and they are often even 
single buildings.  Instead of shifting existing height and density limits around a large site, 
DC PUD applicants often seek additional overall height and density for their small-scale 
projects.  In return for height and density, developers are expected to contribute amenities 
and benefits to the public. 
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The critical differences between PUDs in DC and in other cities, then, are the size and 
scale of the projects, as well as availability of extra height and density.  Most other 
jurisdictions only designate large tracts of land as PUDs (such as 40 acres in Alexandria, 
VA), while DC allows projects as small as 15,000 square feet to be designated as PUDs, 
with DC Zoning Commission flexibility to allow even smaller projects to go through the 
process.  With such small projects up for contention as PUDs, the process becomes less 
about making large, cohesive projects that must stray from the zoning a bit to work better 
overall, and more about gaining additional height and density for individual buildings, in 
return for providing some benefits for the community.  This additional height and density 
often provides the kinds of returns that developers need to make a project fiscally solvent; 
without them, the architects, developers, and land use attorneys argue, far fewer high 
quality development projects would be built in DC. 
In many ways, DC’s PUD process has—over time—morphed from a typical PUD 
process into a type of incentive zoning, in which developers offer specific benefits to the 
community, in return for receiving specific variances from existing regulations.  
Although the bulk of this paper will focus on improving with the PUD process and 
regulations as they exist, the final section on “Thinking More Radically” will address 
whether this kind of contract or incentive zoning use for PUDs is acceptable, and what 
other options are available to the city to address this most fundamental concern. 
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How does DC’s PUD process works 
According to DC Zoning Regulations section 2406 (“PUD Filing Requirements”) 
and 2407 (“Processing of First-State PUD Applications”), DC’s PUD process should 
unfold in the following proscribed steps: 
1) Developer files PUD application in conjunction with request for change of 
zoning, and pays fees to city. 
2) Tem days before filing, applicant mails written notice of intent to file with the 
Advisory Neighborhood Commission for the area, and all property owners within 
200 feet.  At time of filing, developer indicates that notice has been sent. 
3) Commission refers PUD application to DCOP, which reports to Commission 
whether application is consistent with PUD purpose, and whether hearing should 
be held. 
4) Commission decides whether public hearing shall be granted for the application. 
5) If public hearing is granted, DCOP will review application, prepare an impact 
assessment of the project, including reports from city housing, preservation, and 
transportation agencies. 
6) DCOP reports to Commission on: suitability of site for PUD use, appropriateness 
of character, scale, mix of use, design, other public benefits; compatibility of 
proposed development with Comprehensive Plan and PUD goals. 
7) Public notice is given for hearing of PUD application. 
8) At hearing, the developer/applicant must justify his proposal and inform the 
commission of his efforts to work with ANC and other community groups. 
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9) The Commission shall approve, deny, or modify the application.  In an 
acceptance, the commission shall set forth appropriate zoning classification for 
the project, detailing elements, guidelines, conditions to be followed.  This is 
valid for one year. 
10) The developer then submits a second–stage PUD application to the Commission, 
providing much more detail on the proposed development project. 
11) The Commission reviews the second-stage application, and decides whether to 
schedule a second-stage public hearing.  A second stage hearing shall be granted 
if application is in accordance with first-stage approvals and conditions. 
12) The Commission submits application to DCOP for coordination, review, report, 
impact assessment of final design, including input from relevant city agencies. 
13) Notice for public hearing is given. 
14) If commission finds application is in accordance with purpose of Zoning 
Regulations, PUD process, and first stage approval, commission grants approval 
to second-stage application. 
15) Developer has 2 years to file for building permit, and three years to start 
construction. 
 
This is the process, as laid out explicitly in the regulations.  It is important to note that 
there is no formalized discussion of the interaction between community members and the 
developer.  Rather, it is simply stated that the developer must alert the ANC as to the 
hearing, and must provide evidence that he has done so and has made an effort to work 
with them.  It is not clearly established what constitutes proof of that interaction.   
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In addition to not discussing the specifics of the developer-community interaction, 
there are a number of assumed steps that are not explicitly touched upon in the 
regulations.  Interviewees for this project were asked to explicitly describe their step-by-
step experiences in going through a PUD process, including those steps not included in 
the regulations. This more fleshed-out, nuanced description of events (including the 
perspectives of each of the interviewee groups) is laid out below. 
 
1) A developer or other landowner starts thinking about applying for a PUD 
designation for a piece of property. 
2) The potential applicant meets with OP Development Review Specialists for initial 
input on the feasibility of the project as a PUD.  In this meeting, OP staffers also 
urge (but do not require) the applicant to meet with the relevant ANC and/or 
community group. 
3) Through subsequent meetings, the potential applicant works with OP 
development review specialists to refine the application so that it is most likely to 
pass the initial stage of review by the Zoning Commission (the decision-making 
body in this case).  In this stage, the applicant creates an initial list of amenities 
and benefits (“the proffer”) that will accrue to the community if the development 
is built. 
4) Ten days before formally applying for PUD status, the applicant is required to 
give notice of the impending application, by mail, to the relevant ANC and to 
neighbors within 200 feet. 
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5) The developer files its application with the Zoning Commission via the Office of 
Zoning; copies are sent to OP for review. 
6) OP reviews the application and writes a “set-down” report, recommending that 
ZC either set the application down for a hearing or deny it before the hearing. 
7) At its next regularly scheduled public meeting, the ZC reviews the initial 
application, and decides to set it down for hearing, or it denies the application 
outright.  The developer is not required to attend or speak at this meeting.  
Members of the public and the ANC do not speak at this meeting.  Staff from OP 
does speak at this meeting; they relate their judgment about whether or not the 
project should be “set down.” 
8) After the proposal has been “set down,” the developer works with OP and the 
community to further refine the application over the course of several months.  
OP makes recommendations to the applicant based on prior experiences with 
similar PUD projects, knowledge of the ZC’s likes and dislikes, and its own 
priorities.  According to the planners interviewed, recent priorities have included 
affordable housing and green features, such as green roofs.  OP also provides 
informal design review comments, recommending higher quality materials or 
different design features that might better fit the site, the community, etc. 
9) During this period of re-work, the developer usually presents the project to the 
relevant community and seeks input on the project.  Negotiations with the 
community proceed in an undefined, amorphous way that is often quite 
contentious.  The community is generally quite concerned with height of project, 
and with parking/traffic.  During this time, developers may receive contrasting 
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input from individual community members and from ANC members.  In this case, 
he may have difficulty ascertaining which input to weigh more heavily.  
10) The developer modifies the application according to the comments from the OP 
and from the community (the two are generally in line with each other).  When 
OP and the ANC differ in their input, the developer usually gives more weight to 
OP’s comments, which are seen to reflect more closely the opinions of ZC.  
11) Developer submits final application to ZC via the Office of Zoning.  Copies are 
sent to OP for review. 
12) OP staffer writes final recommendation report to ZC, recommending that the case 
be accepted or denied, and highlighting potential issues that should be addressed 
before the project can proceed.  According to chapter 24 of DC’s regulations, the 
OP staffer should base his/her recommendation to ZC on the “suitability of the 
site for use as a PUD, the appropriateness, character, scale, mixture of uses, and 
design of the uses… and other identifiable public benefits, and compatibility of 
the proposed development with the comprehensive plan, the goals of the PUD 
process in 2400 and the PUD evaluation standards in 2403.  These 2403 
evaluation standards mandate that OP ensure that the project is “acceptable in all 
of the following categories, and superior in many of the following categories”: 
1) Urban design, architecture, landscaping, or creation or 
preservation of open spaces; 
2) Site planning, and efficient and economical land utilization; 
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3) Effective and safe vehicular and pedestrian access, transportation 
management measures, connections to public transit service, and 
other measures to mitigate adverse traffic impacts; 
4) Historic preservation of private or public structures, places, or 
parks; 
5) Employment and training opportunities; 
6) Housing and affordable housing; 
7) Social services/facilities; 
8) Environmental benefits, such as: stormwater runoff controls in 
excess of those required by Stormwater Management 
Regulations, use of natural design techniques that store, infiltrate, 
evaporate, treat, and detain runoff in close proximity to where 
the runoff is generated, and preservation of open space or trees; 
9) Uses of special value to the neighborhood or the District of 
Columbia as a whole; and 
10) Other public benefits and project amenities and other ways in 
which the proposed PUD substantially advances the major 
themes and other policies and objectives of any of the elements 
of the Comprehensive Plan. 
In contrast, planning staff noted that they actually based their 
recommendations on: 
1) Whether the project is consistent with the comprehensive plan. 
2) Whether the project “fits well” with the neighborhood. 
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3) Whether the project truly is a “superior” project in its own right. 
4) The design and materials of the proposed project. 
5) Whether the developer’s proffer seems reasonable given the 
amount of zoning relief that he/she is asking for. 
6) The precedent this case would set for the future. 
13) A public hearing of the Zoning Commission is held.  The developer/applicant, the 
OP planner charged with the case, and a representative of the relevant ANC 
present their perspectives to the ZC. 
14) Although the ZC can make a judgment at that time, it usually requests more 
information from applicant, and adjourns to make the decision at a later date. 
15) At a later, regular monthly public meeting, the ZC sets down its decision to 
accept, deny, or delay (if ZC has further questions) the application.  This decision 
is called the “proposed action.”  According to interviews with planners, the ZC 
seems to base its decision upon (in order of importance): 
1) Does the project fit with the comprehensive plan? 
2) Would the project benefit the neighborhood, and the city? 
3) Is the architecture “good” enough? 
4) Has the community been sufficiently involved in the process? 
5) If items 1-4 have been met, does the proffer seem commensurate 
with the zoning relief requested by the applicant? 
16) There is an open period during which the public can appeal the ZC’s decision. 
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17) If there are no appeals, or if the appeals are unsuccessful, the proposed action 
becomes a “final action.” Notice of the action is published, and the developer can 
go forward with the rest of the development process. 
 
What are the benefits of PUDs in DC? 
Despite the complexity of the PUD regulations and process in DC, they provide a 
number of critical benefits, according to those interviewed for this project. First, PUDs 
provide a way of ensuring that a given project receives at least some design review, thus 
ensuring that better, higher quality projects are built.  This design review happens as an 
informal portion of OP’s review of a PUD application.  OP, as well as the ANCs and the 
ZC, always push the developer applicants to incorporate better design and better 
materials (according to each individual’s perspective on what constitutes better design 
and materials) into the project.  By contrast, matter-of-right projects (those that require no 
variances, special exceptions, or PUD designations) proceed without any design review, 
and without interacting with the Office of Planning.  Nearly all interviewees confirm that 
the PUD design review process results in higher quality development—better materials, 
better design—than matter-of-right.  Additionally, a survey of DCOP planners reveals 
that most planners think that the evaluation of building design and architecture is one of 
the most important parts of the PUD process. 
Secondly, PUDs allow citizens to provide input into projects built in their 
neighborhoods.  In cases of regular, matter-of-right development, there are no structured 
channels for community input, and developers are not required to respond to the concerns 
of the community in any formal way.  In PUDs, however, developers are encouraged to 
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work closely with citizens (through the ANCs) to make projects that are satisfactory to 
all.  In addition, the Zoning Commission is required to give the opinion of the ANC 
“great weight” as it decides whether to approve or deny a PUD application.  Most 
interviewees named this encouragement of community input as one of the great benefits 
of the PUD process.  
The third major benefit of PUDs in DC is that they provide a way for taller buildings 
to be built, and at greater densities, than would be allowed by matter-of-right.  Promoting 
density in the District, where it makes sense—near jobs, transit, shopping, schools, and 
nightlife—is good for DC’s economy, good for the environment, and good for the region 
as a whole.  Not only is additional height and density of benefit to the city, but also it is 
of enormous benefit to the developer.  Sometimes a good project can only “pencil out,” 
financially, with that extra height or density.  Allowing developers extra height and 
density, while still making a profit, benefits the entire city’s built landscape.  
Fourth, besides providing attractive, buildings at higher densities on urban sites near 
transit, PUDs also provide the community and the city at large with much-needed site-
specific benefits and amenities.  These benefits include affordable housing, landscaped 
parks and open spaces, parking garages, and more.  For example, a 2005 project located 
in Friendship Heights, on the DC-Maryland border, created a small on-site daycare center 
for the community, has created a pocket park for shared resident and community 
enjoyment, and has also designated 15% of its project as affordable.  The negotiation and 
community-input process in this and other PUDs provides neighborhoods with a much 
needed opportunity to fund vital enhancement projects.  
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Fifth, PUDs provide an unexpected benefit: they allow the City to rezone properties 
into compliance with the most current comprehensive plan, without “losing face.”  
Occasionally, the City’s zoning map is inconsistent with the comprehensive plan, which 
should guide all development in DC.  When the two documents are out of alignment for a 
given parcel of land, a developer has a strong case for a PUD.  Of course, one could 
argue conversely that the zoning map should always be consistent with the 
comprehensive plan, and that it is the planning department’s responsibility to guarantee 
that this be so.  If the two are not consistent, developers and other interested parties 
should be able to request that the zoning map be brought into conformance, without 
having to proffer amenities to the city. 
Sixth, and finally, PUDs provide the city with a means of allowing more interesting, 
creative buildings to be built.  DC’s severe height restriction means that the downtown is 
filled with what many interviewees referred to as “the box with windows.”  This style is 
well known on K Street, in particular.  Allowing deviation from the City’s strict height 
and lot occupancy guidelines allows for some variation along a street front, and allows a 
builder to add such ornamental features as towers, turrets, and entranceways that might 
otherwise be impossible.  This benefit—providing visual excitement to an otherwise less-
than-exciting downtown vernacular—should not be undervalued. 
 
How do DC’s PUDs succeed?  
A good portion of those interviewed commented that, in general, DC’s PUD process 
is working well and is achieving its goals—namely providing developers with design 
flexibility in return for providing superior projects to the community.  Most of those 
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interviewed comment that the process must also be satisfactory to the developers 
involved, since the number of PUD applications continues to rise each year, despite 
general complaints about the length and uncertainty of the process. 
Overall, the majority of interviewees remark that the best part of the process, and the 
part that works most effectively, is the interaction between the development team 
(including the developer, architect, and attorneys) and staff at the DC Office of Planning.  
Developers, architects, and attorneys all comment that the OP staff: 
1) Work at a consistently high-quality, professional level. 
2) Provides helpful, honest, candid feedback from day one. 
3) Is consistent in its treatment of applicants, and its interpretations of the 
regulations. 
4) Is very accessible. 
5) Is well-informed about the preferences and concerns of the Zoning Commission 
(ZC). 
 
In particular, the development teams enjoy working with staff at the Office of 
Planning on the back-and-forth, application refinement process that occurs between the 
set-down and the public hearing before the Zoning Commission.  The informality of this 
process is appealing to both planners and to the development teams, and it allows 
developers to get further input and assistance from OP whenever needed.  Most of those 
interviewed do not feel that a more formal process or more proscribed design guidelines 
are needed; the informality of the process seems to work well. 
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OP planners (predominantly Development Review Specialists) also report that the 
best part of the PUD process is their work helping development teams refine and improve 
their applications.  Most planners find the back-and-forth process with developers to be 
satisfying and productive.  More broadly, most planners comment that the Development 
Review group and the development community have a strong, open, candid relationship 
throughout all interactions.  
While ANC Commissioners generally do not have any words against OP, only one 
Commissioner describes OP’s work as one of the best and most effective parts of the 
PUD process.  The other Commissioners do not point to any one part of the PUD process 
as working especially well.  One ANC Commissioner, however, appreciates that 
community input is required at all, and believes that to be one of the greatest strengths of 
the PUD process.  Most interviewees recognized that planners were put in a potentially 
awkward situation—caught between listening and responding to public input and acting 
in the best interest of the public, and moving acceptable projects forward at a reasonable 
rate.  An outside observer might worry that the relationship between developers and the 
city is too close, or too cozy, but this did not seem to be the case.  No interviewees, 
including ANC Commissioners, complained of planners working at the behest of the 
developers.   
A minority of developers notes that there are occasional discrepancies between OP 
staff members: one staff person might support a particular project or feature, while 
another might not.  While they are generally supportive of the work of OP, they do wish 
that this inconsistency could be avoided.  Similarly, developers report that any 
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inconsistencies between the OP staff and the ZC (though rare) should be avoided if 
possible. 
 
What are the major problems with PUDs in DC? 
There is one major and overarching weakness with PUDs in DC: nearly everyone 
interviewed sees the results of the process as entirely unpredictable.  This complaint can 
be broken down into two separate areas: 1) time, and 2) the final benefits and amenities 
packages.   
TIME: Although most of those interviewed indicate that PUDs take between 9 and 
12 months, many also indicate that the process can take much longer, and can face many 
unforeseen delays.  According to developers, these delays occur seemingly without 
warning, making the process unpredictable.  They note with frustration that some projects 
seem to sail through the process with no delays, while others are held up for years by 
angry community members.  
BENEFITS and AMENITIES: In addition to the time uncertainty, most note that 
the final outcome of the benefits and amenities negotiation is highly uncertain.  
Interviewees note that there is an enormous range of acceptable benefits and amenities: 
some projects were approved as PUDs with their main benefit being “good design,” while 
other projects were approved as PUDs only after providing great design, affordable 
housing, a green roof, a park nearby, and a large contribution to a local organization.  
These discrepancies not only seem unfair, but also they make it difficult for developers, 
attorneys, and architects to know what to expect when entering the PUD process.   
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These uncertainties, both of time, and of the amenities packages, have enormous cost 
implications to the developer.  A time delay of 6 months can cost hundreds of thousands 
of dollars, as can having to make repeated changes to the design of the building or to the 
amenity packages being offered to communities. 
It might be easy for interviewees to blame the uncertainties of time and of the benefits 
package on the Office of Planning, or on the Zoning Commission, but this was not the 
case.  Instead, most interviewees find that OP and ZC are consistent in their interpretation 
of the regulations, and that ZC is consistent in its final rulings.  What is inconsistent, 
however, is interaction and negotiation between the community and the developer over 
the proposed project.  In the words of one lawyer interviewed, “the community 
involvement process is broken.” 
 
Uncertainty: community involvement process 
Pushback from communities makes sense; people are highly attached to the places 
they call home, and they feel strongly about any changes that might take place.  Indeed, 
in a world in which so much seems out of our control, consistency of the built 
environment seems like one thing that should and could be a constant.  Therefore, people 
push for it to remain a constant, by fighting back against possible new developments in 
the form of PUDs.  According to Gaffney (1973), people are much more emotionally 
invested in their neighborhoods than in other investments, because they cannot just move 
their land. “Landowners therefore pay close attention to local decisions, so that they take 
a strong and steady interest in local government out of proportion to their numbers” 
(Gaffney, 1973, p. 117).  
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This project found that, when people want to fight against a new development like a 
PUD, they often disguise their antagonism toward the project with complaints against 
noise and traffic.  This finding is backed by a large canon of research.  For example, Cox 
and Johnson (1982) find that it is much more acceptable for an individual community 
activist or group to base its complaint against a new project on environmental or traffic 
reasons rather than any other reason, including those of race and SES, in addition to fear 
of change.  
This fear of change, often couched as rational antagonism towards traffic or other 
disruption, rears its head in the form of serious delays for PUD developers in DC.  There 
are a number of ways in which this translates into a “broken” community involvement 
process, according to all of those interviewed in DC.  
First, according to all of those interviewed (including ANC Commissioners) 
communities don’t know how to get involved and stay involved.  Community members 
can become emotional and eager to get involved, but are not necessarily informed 
regarding the best means for doing so.  Second, according to all of those interviewed, 
communities don’t know when to get involved.  Developers and others feel that 
community members become involved very late in the process.  When this happens, they 
are insulted that they were not informed earlier, or feel like they are being rolled over by 
developers and OP. 
Third, interviewees from every perspective reported that communities do not know 
what to ask for from developers (they do not know the range of amenities and benefits 
that are feasible, legal, and reasonable). Developers find that ANCs often seem to speak 
for only a few, rather than for the community at large, leaving large swathes of the 
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community unrepresented. Nowhere in the regulations are the roles of the community and 
the developer and their protocol for interaction specifically laid out.  Instead, OP simply 
encourages developers to meet with, and receive project feedback from, community 
members as soon as possible in the development process.  It seems that communities 
populated with wealthy, highly educated individuals and families are much more likely to 
push back against development projects, and to hold them up. 
 
Uncertainty: amenities and benefits 
“PUD ordinances must walk a fine line between specifying 
in detail the kind of project that is acceptable, and giving 
developers an opportunity under more generalized guidance 
to provide a good development project. This tension has 
always been present and is difficult to resolve” (PAS 545, 
p. 16). 
 
In addition to the confusion on the part of ANCs about how the process works and 
how they should be involved, there is significant confusion on all sides about what can 
and cannot be included in a developer’s proffer (package of offered amenities and 
benefits).  The results of this confusion are two-fold.  First, communities and ANCs do 
not know what to ask for from developers.  Second, developers themselves feel that there 
is little guidance about how much is appropriate to proffer; it is especially confusing 
since proffers seem to vary so much from project to project. 
 
Proffer reasonability  
Interviewees are mixed about whether the proffers have been reasonable for what the 
developers have received in return.  Most interviewees note that the proffers must not be 
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placing an inordinate burden on developers, because the developers continue to apply for 
PUDs and nearly always complete the PUDs once the process has begun.  Most 
interviewees also note that it is nearly impossible to know how “fair” a proffer is, without 
knowing the intimate financial details of the case.  Some planners and ANC 
Commissioners, however—despite recognizing that it is difficult to determine exactly 
how fair the cases are—feel that communities receive too little from developers, and 
should be asking for (and receiving) more. 
 Interestingly, all ANC Commissioners interviewed emphatically state that the 
amenities and benefits should be either directly tied to the projects, or should be focused 
on directly mitigating the effects of the projects.  Real estate developers recognize the 
convenience of being able to make donations to local groups, but comment that it is more 
important to make sure that public benefits really benefit the entire public near the 
project—not just a select few.  For that reason, they feel that amenities and benefits 
should be more closely tied to the building itself.  Planners and attorneys are mixed on 
the subject: some believe that the proffers should be directly tied to the buildings 
themselves or to mitigating its impacts, while others believe that allowing developers to 
make tangible purchases or improvements for local community organizations has been 
and is extremely valuable. 
 All interviewees (including all of the planners, developers, attorneys, ANC 
Commissioners, and architects) who have an opinion on this matter agree that an amenity 
should not under any circumstances consist of monetary contributions to ANCs, or to 
community groups unrelated to the project.  They note that it is difficult to ensure that the 
money will have its intended effects, or the effects promised by the developer; that 
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money donated to an organization in this manner may benefit only a few members of the 
community, and not the community at large; and that it just feels improper.  Several 
planners from other cities were extremely surprised to learn that developers in DC had 
the option of making contributions to community organizations as a part of the proffering 
process. 
 
Proffer consistency 
As mentioned, it seems that some projects were approved with enormous benefits 
packages, while others offer very few benefits to the community.  Although most 
interviewees wish there could be more consistency, most also remark that each ward, 
each neighborhood, each site, and each proposed project is so unique that it would be 
difficult to equalize proffers across projects.  Most also note that doing so would override 
the very purpose of the PUD process: negotiating the details of a project, based on its 
specifics, in order to make it truly superior. 
Despite recognition that proffer consistency is a problem, interviewees have mixed 
feelings about quantifying the proffers.  More than any other group interviewed, the 
planners would prefer a method of objectively quantifying and evaluating the strengths of 
proffers, in order to more easily and directly compare projects.  Some planners 
interviewed even support employing a more mathematical formula between proffers and 
the bonuses received by developers.  A minority of developers interviewed would also 
support a more mathematical relationship between proffers and bonuses, if only to ensure 
greater consistency between cases and more predictability for the process. 
 32 
Every other group interviewed, however, warns against creating a mathematical 
formula of proffers and bonuses; one attorney calls it dangerous and impractical to do so.  
In general, most interviewees think it would be useful to be able to loosely quantify the 
benefits of a proffer package and its costs to the developers, but do not support creating a 
strict x-for-y formula.  They believe that some other method can and should be found for 
achieving greater consistency between cases and between neighborhoods. 
 
Other problems with PUDs 
1) Many interviewees, particularly ANC Commissioners and attorneys, feel that 
PUDs are being used far too often and for too-small projects.  They feel that 
the system should be changed so that there are fewer PUDs—either by making 
more PUDs matter-of-right, or by raising the minimum size so that fewer 
projects were eligible for PUD status. 
2) Several interviewees note that the name “PUD” is meaningless, and sounds 
like bureaucratic jargon.  They wonder if it might be better to re-brand the 
projects, the regulations, and the procedures with a “snazzier” name. 
3) None of those interviewed have a clear sense of how the enforcement of the 
approved plans and proffers works, or even if the enforcement was working at 
all.  Most recognize that the Office of Zoning and the Department of 
Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) are responsible for making sure 
that projects are built and benefits are provided as they were approved, but 
they have little sense of the details involved. 
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4) Several interviewees (predominantly planners) note that getting input on 
applications from other agencies, such as DDOT, the Department of Parks and 
Recreation, and DC Public Schools is extremely difficult and often 
impossible.  They note that these agencies seldom respond to OP’s requests 
for input and that, when they do, it is often very late in the process.  This can, 
in turn, further stall the PUD process. 
5) Many of those interviewed feel that neighborhoods with weak, unorganized, 
or un-savvy ANCs get “steamrolled” by developers, who push projects 
through without receiving or incorporating any meaningful community input.  
Others feel that, when ANCs are less organized, one or two people end up 
speaking on behalf of the entire “community,” in a way that is entirely 
unrepresentative. 
6) In both organized and disorganized ANCs, it is common to have a PUD 
process dominated by a small “vocal minority,” which may not reflect the 
opinions of the large silent majority that may support a project. 
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PUDS AS A FORM OF DEVELOPMENT RISK 
 
“The developer group (including the lender) makes 
assumptions about the nature of the product demanded by 
the market, the price his customer will be able to pay, the 
demands of the local government on the development, and 
the length of the development process.  Although these 
assumptions cannot be refined to statistically reliable 
probabilities, the property developer can practice risk 
management by attempting to validate the assumptions and 
reduce the range of uncertainty”  (Vernor, 1981, emphasis 
mine). 
 
 
From the developer perspective, DC’s PUD issues are ones of risk and uncertainty.  
When a developer does not know how long a process will take, or how much it will 
ultimately cost her, she is less able to accurately forecast future cash flows, and is 
therefore less equipped to successfully judge the outcome of the project before she 
undertakes it.  She exposes herself to the possibility that the project’s outcomes will vary 
greatly from the anticipated outcomes, and that she will thus lose money in its 
undertaking.  According to Vernor, “the length of time required to produce a project is 
one of the greatest risk factors confronted,” in undertaking a development project 
(Vernor, 1981).  In DC, it appears that navigating the PUD process is, in turn, one of the 
greatest risk factors contributing to the length of time required for that project. 
Although often used interchangeably, it is important to note that risk and uncertainty 
are separate concepts.  “Risk” is a statistically predictable set of odds, or a calculated 
likelihood of a certain event taking place (Adams et all, 2005, p. 50).  Risk can also be 
understood as the variance between the intended and realized results, due to injury, 
damage, or other loss (Vernor, 1981, p. 1).  “Uncertainty,” on the other hand, connotes a 
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lack of knowledge about all possible outcomes, and an inability to predict the likelihood 
of each possible outcome (Adams et all, 2005, p. 50).   
In the case of PUDs, risk can be understood as the percentage likelihood that a project 
will take a certain amount of time to pass through the PUD approval process, or the 
probability that a neighborhood will require one proffer package over another.  Because 
DC PUD outcomes are seen by interviewees as somewhat random and difficult to predict, 
the process can be categorized as a type of uncertainty.  Developers can often estimate 
the range of outcomes possible, but do not know with certainty the likelihood of any one 
outcome over another.  At best, they can only make educated guesses. 
Ultimately, the uncertainty associated with PUDs is like any type of uncertainty or 
risk that a developer faces.  Development theorists point to two main, overarching types 
of risk possible in the real estate development process.  First, there are dynamic, 
speculative risks.  These are the risks associated with, or resulting from, changes in the 
political, social, and economic environment.  The PUD process—in which outcomes are 
dominated by inputs from the political, social, and economic environment—would fall 
under this umbrella.  Within this type of uncertainty, there is the chance for gain as well 
as for loss; if public opinion sways in favor of leniency for the developer, or expediency 
for a project, the developer “wins.”  The second type of risk is static, pure risk, related to 
the physical loss of a property, or damage to that property.  There is only the chance of 
downside associated with this risk.  Although this is a critical factor in real estate 
development, it is not a type of risk related to the PUD process, and will not be examined 
here (Vernor, 1981). 
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My interviews with those familiar with the DC PUD regulations and processes find 
that going through the PUD process predominantly poses financial risks.  Namely, there 
are the risks associated with 1) time delay, and 2) cost uncertainty.  Ultimately, both of 
those risks translate into cost uncertainty for the developer, as time delay merely adds 
more cost to the process.  Although developers are often stereotyped as risk-lovers who 
“shoot from the hip,” the truth is that nearly all developers create careful pre-
development projections and pro formas, which show the expected monthly expenditures 
(uses of funds) against the monthly sources of those funds for the entire duration of the 
project.   
In order for a project to work, the sources and uses must match each month (ie: the 
project must be able to meet its own capital needs).  In addition, during this current 
economic crisis, those few banks that are lending are requiring extremely conservative 
and careful underwriting; this means that developers are unable to “pad” their sources 
and uses of funds budgets in order to avoid cost overruns from any delays in the PUD 
process.  Developers must accurately forecast their financial needs before the start of the 
project; failure to do so will guarantee failure of the development project.  In addition, if 
cash profits from the sale or rental of the property (whichever its intended use), accrue 
later than projected, then the developer may lack the necessary funds to keep the project 
moving forward.  In this case, the developer may need to seek more funding from its debt 
providers. 
In this chaotic economic climate, seeking additional funding from lenders may be 
entirely untenable.  Few lenders are providing leniency on loan terms and limits, and 
almost no lenders are offering re-financing options for projects in distress.  Since 
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additional funding is unavailable from lenders, a developer would have to seek an 
additional capital call from his investors.  Not only is this unprofessional, indicating to 
the investor that the developer was unable to fully anticipate his needs before the start of 
the project, but also this would result in an undesirable, lower IRR to the investor (since 
he will be receiving the same or perhaps lower returns on a larger equity infusion).  Even 
if the project performs better than expected, the investor still makes lower returns than 
anticipated before making his initial investment.  In addition, the more funds that need to 
be put into a project over a longer time period, the less likely the developer himself is to 
be able to profit from that project.  As Adams et al (2005) have stated succinctly, 
uncertainty itself carries with it enormous transaction costs, so developers must seek to 
understand and model uncertainty as much as they can in order to keep those costs low. 
If a developer does not effectively control the risks associated with his project, he 
stands to lose on other fronts as well.  Not only does he stand to lose his invested capital 
and the guarantees for which he is personally accountable, but also he stands to lose his 
professional reputation, and the opportunity to do future business.  When a developer 
ineffectively calculates and controls for the risks associated with his project, the 
community also stands to lose.  It is stripped of tax revenues, as well as other future 
revenues or services that the project could have provided.  It is clear that the stakes are 
high for any real estate developer; he must account for and control risk if he wants to 
continue doing business.  
Because of the negative consequences of time and cost overruns, developers must 
manage these uncertainties before the project is undertaken, in order to succeed.  The 
process itself is simple, according to Vernor: 1) identify where you are exposed to lose; 
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2) estimate frequency/severity of potential losses; 3) select how to deal with that 
possibility; and 4) put the plan into action and monitor the outcome (Vernor, 1981).  
Vernor’s method is very similar to that of real estate expert James Graaskamp, who 
advocates the following risk management process: 1) identifying exposures to surprise 
and financial loss; 2) estimating economic consequences; and 3) choosing risk 
management methods to control and mitigate those consequences (Mun, 2004).  
Once the risks are identified and quantified, a developer has several options for 
dealing with them.  First, the developer can choose to simply “take that hit” if he can bear 
the capital cost.  Second, if the risk appears to be too great to bear, the developer could 
take out insurance against that risk before he begins on a project.  This might come in the 
form of a contractual agreement that shifts uncertainty to another party involved in the 
deal, such as the architect or the contractor, or it may be actual insurance purchased to 
hedge the deal.  Faced with an uncertainty too large to bear, the developer could also 
simply create an up-front capital replacement reserve to be used in the case that the worst 
risks are realized.  Of course, this has large cost implications for the developer, but 
because they are known up front, rather than appearing unexpectedly during the 
development process, they can be effectively modeled and accounted for in the uses of 
funds (Vernor, 1981).  Finally, the developer always has the option of simply not moving 
forward with the project at all, and avoiding the potential for further losses. 
In terms of PUDs in DC, the topic of this research paper, the most relevant risk 
management step is Vernor’s and Graaskamp’s first: inquiring into the feasibility of the 
project, using all financial and statistical analysis tools at hand.  There are two main 
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techniques that can be used to inquire into the feasibility of a project: 1) probability 
forecasting; and 2) scenario planning/simulation.   
In the first technique, probability forecasting, one creates a theoretical range of 
possible outcomes and attaches a value to each of those outcomes occurring.  He must 
make sure to use subjective assessments of the probability of each outcome, and to be 
honest, consistent, and not overly optimistic by attaching an artificially high percentage 
likelihood the most desirable outcome.   
The quantitative value of each outcome can be multiplied by the likelihood of that 
outcome, and all weighted outcomes should be summed to find the ultimate weighted 
probable outcome cost.  This amount should then be discounted back using the 
developer’s internal discount rate and the expected time delay.  A variation of this 
technique is also known as the Hurwicz approach, in which a decision-maker states his 
degree of optimism on scale of 0 to 1, with 1 being total pessimism, then uses that 
percentage to weight each possible outcome (Byrne, 1996).  
In addition to weighted statistical analysis, one might also use scenario planning or 
simulation in order to judge the likely outcomes of an event or series of events (Byrne, 
1996).  Jonathan Mun also encourages this type of  “what-if” or sensitivity analysis, as 
the method most likely to reveal which variables drive or impact that bottom line more 
than any others (Mun, 2004, p. 16).  According to Byrne, the thoroughness required for in 
scenario planning is rare in the field of real estate: even when developers do assess risk, 
Byrne states that they do not pay enough attention to the range of possible/probable 
outcomes.  Instead, they look only at the best outcomes, without a rigorous look at the 
kind of stress sensitivity outlined here (Burne, 1984).  In the stress-test method that Byrne 
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and Mun endorse, one might create multiple different scenarios for how a project might 
move forward.  Next, he might use modeling software such as Excel, ARGUS, or YARDI 
to examine the effects of each of these scenarios on the project’s bottom line.  
Performing scenario simulations will allow the developer to see the broad range of 
possible outcomes, should the circumstances surrounding his project vary from those 
desired.  The developer must then compare this range of outcomes against his own 
appetite for risk.  For example, would he be willing to go forward with a project if only 
one in twenty scenarios fails, or puts it “under water?”  Would he be willing to go 
forward with it if ten of the twenty scenarios sink the project?  These are the decisions 
that must be made on an individual, case-by-case basis.  Byrne notes that different people 
are comfortable with different levels of risk and return: “different decision-makers’ 
responses to the same situation can result in different decisions, each of which may be 
capable of rationalization” (Byrne, 1996, p. 27). 
Going through this process will reveal to the developer what are the most likely issues 
to arise, and what impact each will have on the bottom line.  He can then use this 
information to create an action plan for dealing with each of those potentially fatal issues, 
before they arise.  For example, if the probable cost of the project (weighted by 
likelihood) is too great to bear, then the developer might scrap the project entirely, to 
avoid that risk.  Conversely, if it appears that the risks of the project are negligible, then 
the developer might create no action plan for dealing with the risks.   
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RISK MITIGATION TACTICS FOR PUDS 
Now that we have examined how developers normally assess and guard against 
risk—by using probability or sensitivity analyses, deciding on how projected outcomes 
measure against the individual’s risk appetite, and creating a course of action to deal with 
those risks—it is worth outlining how developers could apply these techniques to PUDs 
in DC. 
The first technique developers considering PUD projects should use is probability 
modeling, using previous and existing cases of PUDs as the basis for estimating 
probabilities.  As outlined earlier, the main cause of increased delay and cost is the level 
and timing of community involvement in the PUD process.  Therefore, a developer 
seeking to undertake a PUD project would be well-served to examine how the project 
matches up against similar recent projects in the neighborhood, and against similar 
projects in other neighborhoods.  What did those communities demand from the PUD 
process?  How long did they hold up the process, while it was passing through the zoning 
committee?  How much, in the end, was required in the proffer for that project?   
Once the developer has obtained this historical data, he can compare the 
characteristics of his project against those others.  He should look at whether his project’s 
ANC is more or less vocal than those of past projects (perhaps due to changeover in ANC 
Commissioners and their various personalities).  Is the community more or less active 
than it was in the past?  Is his proposed project denser than the one that was held up for 
two years as too dense for a neighborhood?  Will this project generate more traffic than 
the one that was held up for years on traffic arguments?  Judging his own project and the 
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community’s characteristics against past cases and political environments should give the 
developer a strong sense of each expected outcome and its likelihood.  
The developer should also compare the strategy he plans to use with the community 
against the tactics used by developers in those historical PUD cases.  Interviewees 
generally recognize that PUD processes proceed more smoothly when a developer is 
involved in the community earlier, and when he is truly more open to receiving 
community input in those early stages.  Therefore, when a developer examines himself 
against past cases, he should ask: will I be inviting community input before this past 
project did?  If so, he could reduce the likelihood and expected duration of delays, as well 
as additional capital requirements, in his probability models. 
Similarly, the developer should also compare the current Zoning Commission (ZC) to 
the ZC at the time of his comparison project(s).  Is the ZC more vocal or demanding now, 
or was it more so then?  Do today’s commissioners have certain pet projects that they will 
require be a part of the PUD process with high certainty?  Is today’s ZC more or less 
likely to make a developer “return to the drawing board” than it was in the past?  These 
kinds of trends should be noted and incorporated into the probability modeling for the 
PUD at hand.   
In general, the developer should seek to understand what is a likely proffer that the 
neighborhood will demand and the ZC will sign off on, given what similar neighborhoods 
have demanded in the past, and the strength of the current ZC.  Once this has been 
ascertained, the developer can carefully quantify the expected costs of that proffer.  To do 
this, the developer should assign a monetary value to each of the possible proffer 
packages and time delays, and should weight each of those packages and delays 
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according to its likelihood of being demanded (given ANC strength, amount of 
solicitation of neighborhood input, etc.).  Summing these weighted outcomes will give an 
average expected outcome of the project’s PUD-related cost to the developer.   This can 
also be discounted across time, according to the probable length of delay expected and 
the developer’s internal discount rate. 
Once this expected cost is known, the developer can analyze it against his own risk 
profile and can decide if this expected cost acceptable to his bottom line.  If the answer is 
no, then he should not go forward with the project.  If the answer is yes, however, then 
the developer should continue to move forward with the development process, while 
creating and implementing an action plan to reduce the likelihood of any one of the 
potential negative outcomes occurring.  
There are a number of qualitative action plans a developer could undertake in order to 
limit the likelihood of an unwanted outcome.  For example, the development team should 
be carefully selected to include individuals with significant experience in undertaking 
projects of that type in that specific community.  Having such experience will help the 
team understand how best to connect with ANC commissioners and other community 
members, and how best to negotiate the proffer carefully, such that the developer’s profit 
is not squeezed out.   
It is also important that the development team build trust with the local community.  
Not only does this help speed the process, but also it ensures that the community will not 
try to sabotage a project in the final hour, thus delaying it further.  Finally, the 
development team should also be familiar with the local political climate, to ensure that it 
can accurately assess the inclinations of the ZC before undergoing the PUD process.  
 44 
Each of these qualitative steps can help the developer more actively understand and 
control the risks to which he is exposed in the PUD process, should he decide to move 
forward with it. 
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IMPROVING PUDS:  
CITY-LEVEL STEPS TO REDUCE UNCERTAINTY 
 
“A prime role for public policy is to reduce or contain risk 
and uncertainty in order to enhance user, developer, and 
investor confidence in new forms of development” (Adams 
et al, 2005, p. 38). 
 
While developers themselves are responsible for understanding and controlling the 
risks associated with their projects, there are also a multitude of steps the city of DC 
could take in order to limit developer exposure to the PUD-related risks outlined in this 
paper.  Most experts on development risk agree that, in general regarding development 
issues, the public sector should lead in clarifying public policy and processes, as well as 
guaranteeing its own involvement, in order to build confidence and increase certainty in 
the private sector (Adams et al, 2005).  
The city already does at least one part of the process well, according to experts on 
development risk: it requires the use of a form of binding development agreements.  
Development agreements are often used in PUDs or other potentially contentious 
development situations, to “formalize and stabilize decisions made in the course of a 
community’s underlying discretionary land use control system” (Porter and Marsh, 1989, 
p. 31).  This means that, once all the details of the proffer package are hashed out, the city 
and the developer commit to the agreement in writing.  Though it may seem an 
unnecessary formal step, going through this process assures the developer “that the rules 
of the game will not change, for without such assurance, the developer incurs greater risk 
in constructing infrastructure and providing public benefits during a project’s early 
 46 
states” (Porter and Marsh, 1989, p. 3).  Using a binding development agreement also 
ensures that the developer will follow through with the plans accepted by the ZC and the 
ANC. 
Speaking more generally about development risk, every city has the ability to reduce 
uncertainty in the development process by ensuring access to more transparent 
information systems (Adams et al, 2005).   If information is power, then increasing 
access to information through transparency empowers all involved, including developers 
and the neighborhood constituents.  In the PUD process, this could entail providing 
access to a database of previous PUD cases, including information about the proffer 
packages and cause for delays, if any.  Providing access to this information would allow 
developers to better model their expected outcome values using the probability methods 
outlined above.   To address the uncertainty of proffer size, DCOP could even create a 
clearly written set of proffer guidelines for developer use, including what has and has not 
been acceptable in past. This would be particularly meaningful if there was buy-in from 
the Zoning Commission (ZC) agreeing to use previous cases as precedent for those in the 
future. 
More specifically, much of the risk in DC’s PUD process comes from the uncertainty 
of timing surrounding the process, and there are at least five distinct steps the city could 
take in order to limit this uncertainty.   First, the city could establish more clear 
regulations stating rules and timing of engagement between developers and community 
stakeholders.  Second, the DC Office of Planning could conduct outreach programs to 
communities to better define the community role and timing of input in the PUD process.  
Third, DCOP could serve as an intermediary in facilitating discussions between 
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developers and community, or could act as a guide, walking communities through the 
process in the same way that it does developers.  Similarly, an unrelated third-party 
mediator might also serve to equitably facilitate discussions between developers and 
community.  Fourth, the City Council could establish a “cut-off” point for community 
involvement in the PUD process, after which negotiation continues between the 
developer and city alone.  This would allow developers to cap their uncertainty related to 
the community’s involvement. In the section that follows, these potential solutions, as 
they relate specifically to each of the main problems with PUDs indicated by 
interviewees. 
In seeking solutions, I relied heavily upon suggestions and input from the DC 
interviewees themselves, with the understanding that looking to other cities’ PUD 
regulations might not be helpful.  In terms of both planning and PUDs, DC is unusual.  
Planning-wise, the city contains relatively little developable open space, and it has very 
strict height and density limits.  Because there is so little space for development, and 
because land values are so high, many developers are eager to maximize height and 
density, since that key to maximizing profit.  
In jurisdictions with less severe height restrictions, maximizing height and density is 
less vital for developers, and it is a less important part of the PUD process.  In addition, 
other jurisdictions may have very different planning governing bodies; these may include 
a planning commission, a strong mayor, or a city council that must approve all planning 
cases.  In DC, however, the city has no planning commission, and neither the mayor nor 
the City Council is required to weigh in on planning cases.  PUD-wise, it is most 
important to remember that most other jurisdictions use PUDs for different circumstances 
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than DC: for large-scale, neighborhood-type development, rather than the single, smaller-
scale projects in the District.  
For these reasons, any re-formulation of DC’s PUD regulations and procedures will 
have to be based predominantly on the needs, constraints, and goals of this city in 
particular. Therefore, the following possible solutions to the problems identified above 
are based more on the ideas and suggestions of the DC PUD interviewees than on the 
mechanics of other jurisdictions’ PUDs, although those are drawn on where they can 
provide relevant help in framing regulation text.  DCOP and other agencies concerned 
with updating the city’s existing PUD regulations and processes should think of the 
solutions listed as a menu of options, from which any number of items can be 
implemented, alone or in combination.  In addition, since DC uses its PUDs more like 
contract or incentive zoning than other cities use their own PUDs, one should also 
remember that it may be possible to think more radically entirely about the process, and 
to recreate it in a way more suitable to the city’s overarching goals. This possibility will 
be examined in the section following. 
 
PROBLEM 1: Communities do not know how the PUD process works or how to get 
involved.  Several interviewees note that few citizens are aware of what PUDs are and 
how the process works.  Even those who are aware and who have been involved in the 
past are confused about the stages of the process and the roles of each party involved.  
Currently, the rules of engagement between developers and communities are not clearly 
laid out in any document or guidelines.  The regulations require only that: 1) developers 
notify ANCs and neighbors within 200 feet of the site, ten days before the set-down 
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hearing, and 2) ANCs report their opinion of the proposed project to the ZC at the public 
hearing.  The regulations also allow citizens and other community groups to voice their 
concerns at this time.  While DCOP encourages developers to work with ANCs and 
community members from the beginning of the process, and DCOP helps facilitate this 
interaction, in no part of the regulation is this interaction defined. 
 
SOLUTION 1.1:  
The regulations should clearly state the rules and timing for engagement between 
communities and developers, and these rules should be clearly and explicitly delineated 
to ANCs, community members, and development teams. 
 
What should the rules say? 
Several ANC Commissioners feel that ANCs should be involved in working with the 
developers from the very beginning of the process (ie: from the “ground up.”)  This could 
be required in the regulations; developers could be required to show proof of community 
meetings or community input before even approaching DCOP with a potential project. 
Developers and architects also feel that communities should be involved from the 
very beginning of the process, but that there should be a time limit on public input.  If the 
community members and ANCs miss that window of opportunity, then they should not 
be allowed to delay the process.  Imposing a time limit would force the ANCs to be more 
responsible and conscientious when involved in PUD processes.  Having a timeline 
would also allow developers to more accurately model the extent to which ANCs pose a 
risk in derailing the development timeline and other projections.  Changing the process in 
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such a way might shift power to the developer; in order to avoid doing so, the regulations 
could require that the developer approach the community far more than ten days in 
advance of submitting its application to the ZC. 
Although DC is unique, there are some examples of PUD regulation text that clearly 
delineate the public-developer process and relationship, and that may provide helpful 
guidance for how DC could change its regulatory text, in order to clarify this relationship. 
 
From Spokane, Washington: 
“Community Meeting and Public Notice: 
Prior to submittal of the application, the applicant shall conduct a community 
meeting. The applicant shall hold the community meeting no more than one hundred 
twenty days prior to the submission of the application. All public notice and format of 
the meeting shall be given in accordance with the procedures set forth in chapter 
17G.060 SMC for a Type III application.” 
 
From Moscow, ID: 
“Neighborhood Meeting: Every application submittal for a PUD shall be preceded by 
opportunity for neighboring landowners and residents to meet with the applicant to 
review and provide comments on the proposal.  Prior to application submittal the 
applicant shall invite all owners of land within six hundred feet (600’) of the subject 
land to a neighborhood meeting.  The applicant shall consider comments from the 
neighborhood meeting and adjust the proposal if and how deemed appropriate by the 
applicant.  The application submittal shall include a written record of comments 
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received at the neighborhood meeting and a written statement of applicant’s response 
to such comments.  These written records shall be considered as part of the 
preliminary plat application.” 
 
SOLUTION 1.2: 
Once the process has been more clearly defined in the regulations, DCOP should 
reach out and educate ANCs and communities about how the PUD process works, and 
how they can get involved.  This solution has been requested by ANC Commissioners, 
planners, developers, architects, and attorneys; each group independently believes that 
DCOP can and should play a much greater role in community education about PUDs. 
 
In terms of a specific program, I recommend that DCOP, perhaps led by the Ward 
Planners, conduct PUD outreach/training sessions with ANCs.  These sessions would 
focus on how community members should be involved and what is reasonable/legal to 
ask for from developers.  OP could create a 1-concise primer detailing the process for 
ANCs. This would include the rules of engagement between developers and communities 
(solution 1.1) and a section on the purpose of PUDs.  To address NIMBYism, the 
document could emphasize the benefits of density for neighborhoods, the city, and the 
environment, and should mention how greater height and density can be more than 
appropriate in certain locations, such as near transit stops.  This document would be 
easily available online, and would be used as a tool in scheduled outreach meeting with 
ANCs and communities. 
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SOLUTION 1.3: 
DCOP could serve as a facilitator for communities dealing with proposed PUDs.  
Interestingly, DCOP staff often provides developers with guidance through the PUD 
process—helping them draft their applications and learn what to expect from the process 
and from ZC, etc.   Although DCOP staff is more than willing to assist communities 
when asked, they do not automatically offer that same guidance to communities facing 
PUDs.  Since communities are traditionally less proactive than developer applicants 
about approaching DCOP for assistance, it would benefit everyone involved if DCOP 
automatically provided assistance and guidance to the ANCs.  Many of those 
interviewed, including some (but not all) ANC Commissioners, believe that this would 
improve process efficiency. 
 
SOLUTION 1.4: 
DCOP, or an independent third party, could serve as an informed mediator or referee 
between communities and developers.  Even if DCOP does not serve as a facilitator for 
ANCs and community groups throughout the entire process, it would still be helpful for 
an OP staffer to be present at meetings between the community and the developer.  Many 
interviewed—particularly lawyers and developers—envision this person as an instantly 
credible, trustworthy, non-partisan resource about what developers and communities can 
and cannot ask for or do. 
As above, this reduces the burden on developers to explain how zoning works and 
what is or is not legal to the communities.  It also helps reduce the antagonism between 
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developers and community members that results when there is no third party to verify 
each side’s statements, and each party feels that the other might be deceitful.   
The Arlington County, VA, process works in this way.  The site plan/negotiation 
process takes place in a series of informal meetings between the developer and the Site 
Plan Review Committee, which includes members of the Planning Commission, 
members of the Council Advisory Commission, Civic Association representatives, and 
members of the community.  Instead of having the developer meet with the community 
and the planning officials separately, this organized committee, which includes 
community members and planning decision-makers, meets all together to work through 
changes to the process.  Once the Site Plan Review Committee feels comfortable with the 
developer’s plan, it can move forward to review by the Planning Commission. 
The City of Alexandria, VA, circumvents direct developer-community interaction 
altogether, by having its own Office of Planning present its PUD-like cases to the 
communities, and acting as the messenger for carrying those concerns back to the 
developer. In Alexandria, this practice works well.  The planning officials neither endorse 
nor disapprove of projects they present; they present them objectively to the 
communities, and openly solicit feedback and concerns.  The planning officials then 
bring those concerns back to the developer, and work with him to address them.  Once 
refined, the planning officials might bring the plans back to the community for further 
input.  The Alexandria official interviewed comments that the process seems to work 
well.  He believes that community members seem to be supportive of the system and feel 
that it provides them with effective and appropriate channels of input.  Although it would 
mean an increase in amount of work for DCOP, one possible way of dealing with the 
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antagonistic developer-community negotiation process might be following Alexandria’s 
lead and having DCOP present developers’ projects to communities, rather than having 
the developers do it themselves. 
The Boston Redevelopment Agency (BRA) employs a similar strategy for mediating 
between the community and the developer in Boston, MA.  The BRA holds community 
meetings at which it presents a potential development project to the public.  The 
developer may be present at these meetings, but his presence is not required.  The BRA 
collects verbal and written feedback on the project from the public, and is responsible for 
conveying this feedback to the developer.  The BRA then works with the developer, in a 
process very similar to DC’s, to refine the application so that it addresses the concerns of 
the public.   
 
SOLUTION 1.5: 
When the developer has done everything within reason to engage the community and 
work towards mutual goals, and the community has been unresponsive or willfully 
uncooperative, there should be formal means for the developer to indicate to ZC that it 
has tried its best.  Ideally, ZC should incorporate this “proof” of community outreach into 
its consideration of the PUD, and should weight proof of good faith outreach as seriously 
as it does actual approval from the community, when communities are being 
unreasonable or unresponsive. Developers interviewed note that this would be extremely 
helpful in some of the more contentious cases, as it would allow them to control for 
otherwise uncontrollable risks related to community input. 
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In terms of the mechanics of such a scenario, one possibility might be for applicants 
to keep a written record of their interactions with the community, including what requests 
were made, and how the applicant responded to each of those requests.  This record could 
be validated by a third party, such as a DCOP staffer, or other third party mediator called 
for in the previous solutions. This documentation could be submitted to the ZC along 
with the developer’s final PUD application, and could be taken into consideration as a 
part of the overall package. 
Each of the solutions above is meant to improve the PUD process by making the 
process much more transparent, comprehensible, and predictable (if a bit more 
cumbersome).  It is my belief that, if each party in the negotiation clearly understands and 
commits to the rules and time constraints of that negotiation, then these interactions may 
be much less fraught with apprehension and tension.  Assistance and oversight from 
DCOP would help ensure that all parties involved remained within the agreed-upon 
bounds of interaction. 
 
PROBLEM 2: Even when ANCs and communities are familiar with the PUD 
process and understand their relationship with the developer, they are unsure of 
what to ask for from developers.  Many interviewees note that the most successful 
ANCs are those that know what they want and are organized and articulate in asking for 
it from developers.  Many ANCs, however, do not seem to fall into this category.  If all 
ANCs began the negotiation process with the same background knowledge of what 
proffers were possible or likely, proffers might be more consistent across projects and 
across wards. 
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SOLUTION 2.1:  
DCOP should create a clearly written set of proffer guidelines for use by ANC 
members, developers, attorneys, and others.  These guidelines would include what is and 
is not legal to ask for from developers, what communities have asked for or have received 
from developers in the past, and what might be appropriate proffers in certain situations 
or neighborhoods.  In creating a list of potential proffers, the city would have to think 
deeply about one of the main philosophical questions that emerged in the interviews—
whether or not proffers should be strictly tied to the property and to mitigating the impact 
of the development, or whether proffers should be able to accrue to other community 
groups in the area. 
Having a list of suggested proffers might be a welcome middle ground between 
having no formal direction at all, and having a set-in-stone proffer formula (which all of 
those interviewed warn against).  Overall, creating established guidelines would provide 
communities and developers with a common starting point for beginning the process.  It 
would help equalize proffers across the city, since all communities would be working 
from the same list of suggestions.  These guidelines could be distributed and discussed at 
the neighborhood training sessions mentioned as a solution to problem 1. 
 
For example, recent PUD proffers included: 
• Affordable housing units in residential PUDs 
• Monetary contributions to affordable housing funds 
• Monetary contributions to community organizations such as  
elementary schools, recreation centers, and animal shelters 
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• Exemplary urban design and landscaping 
• Environmental/green features on the building 
• Monetary contributions to be disbursed by the ANC 
• Public recreation space or open space preservation 
• Preservation of a historical feature of the property (a church) 
 
A list like this, including all full proffer packages offered in the past five years, 
should be written and distributed to DC’s ANCs and developers as a means of increasing 
transparency and leveling the playing field.  Of course, this list would be subject to 
changes based on the political climate, the city’s budgetary needs, as well as other policy 
changes.  For example, the eventual implementation of the pending inclusionary zoning 
ordinances will mean that mere provision of affordable housing will no longer be 
characteristic of an exemplary project, worthy of additional height or density through the 
PUD process.  Likewise, mandatory green building criteria would eliminate that as an 
option from the list of possible proffer items. 
 
SOLUTION 2.2: 
If DCOP were to make a list of suggested or feasible proffers for distribution to 
ANCs and developers, that list should be neighborhood-specific, since each 
neighborhood’s needs vary so much from another.  In order to make a neighborhood-
specific list, DCOP (particularly the ward planners) could survey the different 
neighborhoods, and DCOP could create inventories of what each neighborhood needs.  
DCOP would distribute these inventories to ANCs themselves, to developers, to 
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attorneys, and they would be available on the web.  ANCs would be reminded to work off 
of their own lists when negotiating with developers, DCOP would use these lists from its 
earliest, pre-hearing meetings with developers, and developers themselves might use the 
lists as they started work on the earliest stages of a project. 
This up-to-date “wish-list” solution would particularly benefit neighborhoods that 
have been disorganized about making requests from developers in the past.  Undertaking 
the process of inventorying community needs alone might help communities be more 
confident about making requests from developers.  In addition, access to this inventory 
would help DCOP ensure that less organized or less savvy neighborhoods still benefit 
from PUDs; in this way, OP might help communities avoid “getting steamrolled.”  
 
NOT A SOLUTION 2.3: 
DCOP should not attempt to equalize proffers across communities by creating a 
formula of what different community benefits are “worth” in terms of bonuses to 
developers.  Nearly all of those interviewed, including individuals from each profession, 
note that this solution would eliminate the degree of negotiation room and site-specificity 
that is so fundamental to PUDs. 
 
PROBLEM 3: The PUD process takes too long, and it can stretch on beyond the 
expected time period. These delays can be quite costly to the developer, and they also 
unfairly benefit those opposing a project. 
 
 
 59 
SOLUTION 3.1: 
DCOP could reduce the mandatory open review/comment periods between each step, 
as well as the final appeals window.  Those interviewed are mixed about this possibility.  
Some feel that the process takes exactly as long as it should take for projects of such a 
large and important scale, while others think that the process could be condensed, by 
shortening the periods between each step.  Shortening these open periods would allow the 
developer to move forward through the process more quickly, with a higher degree of 
certainty. 
 
SOLUTION 3.2: 
Several of those interviewed (including the attorneys and one developer) express 
frustration with the length of time it takes to have PUDs reviewed and approved by the 
National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC), after the plans were approved by the 
Zoning Commission.  One attorney notes that it is not legally required for NCPC to 
review every PUD case—only some are required.  This should be determined and 
clarified. 
 
SOLUTION 3.3: 
At the public hearing, the Zoning Commission has the ability to approve applications, 
deny applications, approve applications with conditions, or request that applicants 
resubmit applications after they have addressed certain concerns.  Developers, architects, 
and attorneys interviewed note that ZC frequently requests changes to developer plans, 
and often asks applicants to resubmit after addressing those concerns.  Depending on the 
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schedule of the ZC, it may be take several additional months before the case can be heard 
again, and before the applicant can continue forward in the development process.  This 
kind of procedural delay can have an enormous cost to developers—one that seems both 
unnecessary and avoidable. 
A solution to this snag in the process has been offered by several of those 
interviewed: instead of doubling applications back through the process, the ZC should 
much more frequently approve applications “with conditions.”  When the ZC is close to 
approving a project, but wants the applicant to make a few minor changes, it should 
simply approve the project, contingent upon those changes being made.  DCOP could be 
responsible for checking to ensure that the changes do actually get made before the 
project proceeds.  Although the ZC does currently have this power, interviewees 
generally feel that it does not use it frequently enough.   In its zoning regulations, the City 
of Madison, WI phrases this idea as: “the plan can be approved as submitted, approved 
with modifications, referred for further consideration, or disapproved” (emphasis mine). 
Several of those interviewed, including an ANC Commissioner, also note that ZC 
should take a more active role in determining the final packages.   They would like the 
ZC to be less reactionary and more proactive.  Planners from other cities who were 
interviewed for this report all note that their PUD decision-making bodies (be they ZC, a 
City Council, or a Planning Commission) take an active role in determining what the 
final development package will be, rather than simply responding to developer offers. 
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SOLUTION 3.4: 
Educate ANCs and communities about the PUD process, how they should be 
involved, and what proffers are feasible and available to them, by implementing any of 
the above solutions for problems 1 and 2.  When the ANCs and communities knows how 
to get involved, are involved from the beginning and cannot get involved at the last 
minute, and know what proffers are reasonable, there may be fewer delays and setbacks. 
 
PROBLEM 4: OP asks other agencies (such as DDOT, DPR, DC Public Schools, 
and DCPD) to review PUD applications, but OP seldom receives responses from 
these agencies.  Even when the agencies do provide feedback, it often comes too late in 
the process to be useful to the developer, or to be meaningfully incorporated into the 
plans without starting from the beginning again. 
 
SOLUTION 4.1: 
If the ZC feels that the input of these other agencies is valuable and necessary, the 
city  should make the agency-input process more formalized, or should even make it 
required in certain circumstances.  In Boston, formal agency comment on each PDA 
(Boston’s version of a PUD) is required.  The Boston Redevelopment Authority 
(Boston’s city planning agency) sends out copies of the PDA application to each of the 
city’s agencies, including housing, schools, police, fire, water and sewer, parks and 
recreation, and transportation, among others.  These agencies must respond by a certain 
deadline.  Agencies can provide their review in-person, at an informal meeting at which 
developers present the proposed project to representatives of the agencies.  Agencies can 
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also respond formally, in writing, to the planning agency.  If no agency response is 
received by the deadline, then that agency forfeits its right to have a say in the project.  
Informally, this is already happening in DC, but it would be helpful for everyone 
involved to have a clear deadline after which it was acceptable to move forward in the 
process, rather than simply waiting until it feels as if enough time has passed, but not 
being able to define how much is enough. 
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OTHER PUD PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 
During the interview process, there were several smaller, less overarching issues that 
emerged.  These could be addressed if the PUD regulations were to be re-written.  
 
1) The regulations should be more explicit about how the PUD relates to the 
underlying zoning.  According to one of the planner interviewees, “if the density 
allowable in a given zone is different than that resulting from underlying zoning, 
the mechanism by which the allowable density is compared should be described.”  
See, for example, zoning regulations from the City of Sacramento, CA state: 
E. Effect of PUD Designation.  A PUD designation 
constitutes an overlay zone.  However, approval of a PUD 
designation does not establish an underlying zone or 
enlarge the uses provided by a zoning classification. (Ord. 
2005-051, 5: Ord. 99-015, 5-4-D). 
 
2) Several planners and one attorney note that it seems strange that, when applicants 
are seeking a map amendment through the PUD process, the applicant only has to 
compare the final project to the requirements of the applied-for zone, rather than 
the original zone.  For example, if a developer owned a property in a C-2-B, and 
was applying to for a PUD and map amendment to a C-3-A, all documentation of 
the project would evaluate it based on how far beyond regular C-3-A the project 
was, rather than how far beyond C-2-B it was.  Interviewees who were concerned 
about this wish to see it reverted, so that a proposed PUD project must be 
evaluated based on how far it deviates from its existing zoning, rather than its 
proposed zoning. 
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3) Several architects note that they would like to see the regulations be more explicit 
about the quality and type of the architectural renderings and the application 
materials for PUDs.  They note that some firms seem to turn in mediocre 
application materials, occasionally even missing important details.  If the 
regulations provided more detail about the size, color, quality, etc. of the 
materials, it might be easier for OP and the ZC to more equitably evaluate 
applications.  
4) The PUD regulations could include introductory language about why more 
density around metro stations and in other nodes is beneficial to the city: it 
promotes public transit use, reduces congestion and pollution, adds to the DC tax 
base, supports local retail, etc.  This type of language would serve to educate the 
public and prevent NIMBY-ism.  
5) There are no formal channels for local businesses to provide input about PUDs.  
In many cases, a PUD project may impact local businesses just as much as it will 
impact local residents—in fact, it may even impact local businesses more.  
However, businesses are not invited to meet with developers, nor are they invited 
to share their opinion before the Zoning Commission.  Perhaps local 
businesspeople could be more formally invited into the structure of each ANC, so 
that their thoughts and opinions could be incorporated into a project.  
Alternatively, perhaps local businesspeople could have a separate channel for 
providing input. 
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THINKING MORE RADICALLY ABOUT DC’s PUDS 
The previous sections of this paper have focused on small-scale changes that could be 
made to DC’s existing PUD regulations and process, in order to address the most 
commonly mentioned complaints about PUDs, and those that affect a developer’s risk 
management practices.  Rather than simply tinkering with the existing PUD regulations 
and procedures, however, DC could be bolder; the City could make large-scale changes 
that more fundamentally address the purpose of its PUDs.  The following is a menu of 
possible large-scale changes that would address some of the underlying issues with PUDs 
in DC. 
First, as the City begins the process of re-writing its zoning regulations and its zoning 
map, it should consider how set in stone those zoning regulations should be.  One 
possibility for re-thinking the way PUDs are used in the city is to fully update the zoning 
regulations and map so that they reflect the City’s actual desired heights, densities, and 
uses—making sure that the zoning map is fully consistent with the Comprehensive 
Plan—and then it should stick much more closely to them.  Once the zoning has been 
updated to represent the type of development the City wants in the first place, there 
would be minimal need for PUDs, except perhaps in very rare cases. 
This possibility would be supported by many of the interviewees, who note that many 
of today’s PUD cases seem motivated by the applicant’s desire to simply update the 
zoning map to more accurately reflect the changing urban landscape.  Several 
interviewees, all ANC Commissioners, note that when developers can get “extra” height 
and density through the PUD process, or can get the actual zone changed, it seems as if 
they are going around the regular zoning process entirely.  In fact, this scenario seems a 
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clear case of what is often called incentive zoning, in which “cities grant private real 
estate developers the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for voluntarily 
providing urban design features, such as plazas and atriums, and social facilities and 
services” (Lassar, 1990. p 99).  Since people are inclined to believe that the existing 
zoning must have been established for a valid reason, it seems that going around this 
zoning must therefore be wrong.  For this reason, community members are justifiably 
wary of PUDs.  Updating the zoning and then “sticking to it” more closely would be one 
way of calming those fears of the community, and eliminating the sense that PUDs are 
being used far too often and for minor projects.  It will also help eliminate the sense of 
unease surrounding the concept that developers may be “paying to play.” 
On the other hand, many interviewees note that there will always be a need for 
flexibility from the zoning regulations, since no one set of regulations can foresee all 
possible future circumstances and can best guide every future decision.  In some cases, 
flexibility from those regulations may be in the best interest of the City and its 
population.  For this reason, even if the City makes a policy shift to allow less deviation 
from the regulations, the option to apply for a PUD should still be open for very special 
cases. 
 Another possible negative repercussion of actually zoning the city as planners 
desire it be built, rather than requiring developers to ask for it, would be the loss of 
proffers, many of which help provide needed infrastructure and amenities to 
communities.  If the city were to eliminate PUDs, then, it would likely need to find 
another way to generate private financing of public projects—perhaps using development 
impact fees.  According to Snyder and Stegman (1986), development fees are monetary 
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contributions made by developers in order to offset the fiscal implications of their 
projects on a community.  These fees must be used to directly offset the project itself, and 
the city must prove that there is a “rational nexus” between the fees charged and the 
project’s impacts. 
A second radical way of changing DC’s PUDs going forward would be to entirely 
eliminate small-scale PUDs, making the process a viable option only for the kind of 
large-scale, mixed-use projects that most other cities think of as PUDs.  In its current 
form, the minimum PUD requirement in DC is only 15,000 square feet in commercial 
zones, where most PUDs are located.  Residential PUDs must be at least one or two 
acres, depending on the zone, to be eligible for PUD designation.  Even those minimal 
requirements, however, are easily overturned by the Zoning Commission, which has the 
authority to allow projects of any size go through the PUD process, at its discretion. 
Making only large-scale projects eligible for PUD status would greatly reduce the 
number of PUDs each year, giving OP and other agencies much more time to work on 
and respond to the PUDs that would still come through the process. This could also help 
quell the anxiety of those interviewed—that PUDs are being used for too many projects, 
and at too small of a scale.  In addition, this would be more in keeping with other cities’ 
PUD processes and regulations.  For comparison, other cities have the following 
minimum size requirements for PUDs or their equivalents: 
• Arlington: no minimum size requirement. 
• Alexandria: 30 acres. 
• Baltimore: the smallest requirement is 2 acres.  Other zones have  
larger requirements. 
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• Boston: 1 acre, and only within certain neighborhoods. 
• Los Angeles: 3 acres. 
• San Francisco: ½ an acre. 
 
A third way of radically changing DC’s PUDs would entail having two separate PUD 
processes, not separated by size or by other physical characteristics, but by the amount of 
process the developer would be willing to go through (and thus the amount of uncertainty 
he was willing to undertake).  In this case, some PUDs could be made automatic or as-of-
right: if the project meets certain minimum requirements, it can get certain pre-
determined bonuses without going through more than a very minimal site-review.  Other 
PUDs could go through the full discretionary process, in order to get the full flexibility 
they need.  This option would be more feasible for developers more comfortable with 
taking on the risks associated with such a large scale, open-ended process. 
According to the PAS Report Number 545, “permitting PUD as-of-right has become 
a popular alternative in many communities… If it is possible to identify and agree on the 
elements of a PUD in the zoning ordinance, approval should follow without difficulty if 
ordinance standards are met…PUD as-of-right is also possible on smaller sites, such as 
infill sites in downtown areas, where the community can establish design requirements in 
its land-use regulations.” (page 14).  Since Washington DC already applies its PUD 
regulations to smaller, infill sites in downtown areas, it seems a likely candidate for this 
form of PUD. 
Having two processes could have a number of benefits.  First, it would reduce the 
number of work-intensive, discretionary PUDs and help unclog the system.  Second, it 
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would altogether avoid the often contentious developer-community negotiation process.  
Third, it would alleviate some developer frustration at the uncertainty of the process, by 
providing an easy menu of options in known quantities.  Fourth, it would alleviate some 
planners’ anxiety about the inequities between different PUD projects and the bonuses 
the developers have received in return for the benefits they have provided. 
However, there are potential downsides to this two-PUD system as well.  First, it 
would probably not be welcomed by ANCs and other community groups, whose input in 
the process would be reduced (or even eliminated in some cases).  Second, when setting 
up the system, it might be difficult to determine what the standards should be (ie: how 
much is each bonus “worth?”).  Third, it would require that the zoning maps and 
regulations be current at all times.  Fourth, if this option became popular with developers, 
it might also eliminate one of the most highly-regarded aspects of PUDs—their ability to 
respond very specifically to the needs and constraints of the site itself, and the 
surrounding neighborhood. 
The main challenge facing the Office of Planning is this: should it accept the current 
purpose of PUDs in DC as valid, and work on improving the process the already exists, 
or should it rethink the underlying concepts behind PUDs in DC, and create a new 
process that promotes the kind of development that the City would like to see occurring 
instead? 
Most interviewees note that the system seems to be working fine as it is, although it 
could be made even more effective by removing the high levels of uncertainty 
surrounding it.  If the City chooses to accept the current purpose of the system and re-
work the regulations to alleviate the concerns of interviewees, it can simply pick and 
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choose between the options listed above: namely educating ANCs and communities, 
clarifying the interactions between developers and communities, and the like.   
Rather than simply improving the current system, the City may choose to re-work it 
entirely.  This choice would be based not on the feedback of interviewees, but on the fact 
that most other cities think of and use PUDs very differently from how DC does.  In most 
places, developers get flexibility from the zoning so that they might build better projects, 
while, in DC, developers get flexibility from the zoning in return for building better 
projects.  The difference is subtle, but important.  If the Office of Planning decides that 
DC should adhere more closely to the concept of PUDs in much of the rest of the nation, 
then it can choose among the different options laid out in the “Thinking More Radically” 
section above. 
As the City chooses a new direction for PUDs, and contemplates re-writing the PUD 
regulations, it should keep in mind several important issues.  First, whatever the PUD 
regulations might be, they should always be kept current in relationship to the most 
recent versions of the zoning regulations, zoning map, and Comprehensive Plan.  
Likewise, those documents should be in tune with the PUD regulations.   
Secondly, DC has adopted a set of Inclusionary Zoning regulations, which will 
require developers in some cases to offer affordable housing units.  In return, they will 
automatically receive extra height and density for those projects.  The effects of 
Inclusionary Zoning (IZ) on PUDs will not be known until IZ is fully implemented, but 
interviewees predict that there will be fewer PUDs (since developers can get nearly as 
much extra height and density through IZ), and that the proffer emphasis will shift from 
affordable housing to something else.  Whatever the case may be, OP should keep an eye 
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on the effects of IZ on PUDs and the PUD process, as it examines how to change the 
these regulations and procedures. 
Regardless of how the Office of Planning chooses to revamp its PUD regulations and 
processes, it should keep in mind that, above all, PUDs are meant to bring a more 
valuable, more desirable, better quality of development into the City.  PUDs can lay the 
groundwork for how we want the city to grow and change, and they set the precedent for 
future development in each neighborhood.  In deciding the fate of PUDs, OP will be—in 
some ways—deciding the fate of the city. 
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CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PLANNING 
 
Although DC uses its PUDs differently from most cities, there are a number of points 
in this report that can be useful to the field of planning at large.  Most notably, it becomes 
clear that the city can play a large part in reducing risk for the private sector.  When the 
private sector—including developers—can act more boldly, assertively, and 
conscientiously, the city as a whole may benefit through increased tax revenues, higher 
quality built landscape, access to greater amenities and housing opportunities, and more. 
Each city has a number of means available for reducing uncertainty in its PUD 
processes, or in any development processes that requires community input.  First, and 
more importantly, the city should increase process transparency.   In the case of PUDs, 
this would entail providing easy access to a log of previous cases, so developers can more 
accurately understand and model expected outcomes.  Second, cities should provide 
mediation between developers and community members, as a way of making those 
interactions more equitable, efficient, and self-contained.  Doing so allows the developer 
to cap his or her uncertainty.  Third, the city should clearly define the roles of developer 
and community, so that all expectations are known and can be clearly modeled. 
Once these qualitative, public policy measures are incorporated into any development 
process, developers can more confidently use the risk modeling techniques outlined in 
this report, knowing that the range of uncertainty is much narrower for each outcome.  
These steps can be taken in any situation in which a city supports development by 
attempting to minimize private sector exposure to unnecessary risks. 
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 After several years of wild, fast-paced growth, the country’s development is now 
at a standstill; there is little to no debt financing available to undertake new development 
projects, and obtaining re-financing on existing projects is nearly impossible.  In the few 
cases in which debt is available, lenders are underwriting projects using extremely tight 
standards.   In the current economy, only projects with low debt coverage ratios, low loan 
to value ratios, and—most importantly for the findings of this report—low uncertainty, 
will be provided with the capital needed to move forward.  For that reason, among many, 
the City of DC and its agents should work to reasonably reduce uncertainties in the PUD 
process, while maintaining the public interest, through the steps outlined.  If the process 
continues with the same amount of risk and uncertainty as it currently entails, it may be a 
long, slow recovery period for the city of Washington, DC. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Item 1: Sample PUD Interview Questions 
The following questions were asked of planners at the DC Office of Planning.  
Individuals from other professions were asked slightly different—though very similar—
questions, based on their areas of experience. 
 
The PUD ordinance: 
1. What is the purpose of having a PUD ordinance?  Does the process accomplish 
this purpose? 
2. Is there a minimum PUD size? Should there be? 
3. How is the PUD related to the base zoning?  Is it related strongly, loosely, or not 
at all?  (Ie: is the extra FAR given on top of the base, etc.?) Or does it work 
independently of the zoning ordinance? 
4. How does PUD relate to TDRs?  Can you add additional TDR FAR onto your 
PUD FAR?  What is the limit? 
5. Is the PUD ordinance consistently interpreted by the DCOP and by the Zoning 
Commission?  
6. Do you think that expectations of amenities and provisions should be laid out 
more mathematically, and be less open to interpretation?  (ie: if applicant provides 
X, city will provide Z).  
a. Would this be a logistical nightmare to try to monitor? 
b. Does the current system provide necessary flexibility? 
c. How would you do this? 
 
Proffering process: 
7. Is there a specific community amenity that planners are always pushing for? Or 
that the community always wants? 
8. What do developers most often want to proffer? Why? 
9. How do community members get what they want from the developer?   
10. How does the developer best satisfy the many different wants and needs of the 
ANC and the OP? 
11. How often are the amenities/proffers something that is off-site? 
12. In your opinion, are the proffers usually reasonable for what the developer is 
asking for in return? 
13. What should neighborhoods and OP ask for from developers, which they are not 
currently asking for? (eg: green building components of project? LEED 
certification?  In-lieu payments to metro?) 
14. What happens in neighborhoods that are less savvy in making requests from 
developers?  Do they get nothing?  Who makes the demands when neighbors do 
not? 
 
PUD process as a whole: 
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15. What are the role/duties of the OP, the developer/applicant, and the ANC in this 
process? What does each entity need to do/provide? 
16. What is the OP looking for in applications?  What are the standards upon which 
OP planners base recommendations of approval or denial? 
17. What design review takes place?  By whom? 
18. What is the Zoning Commission looking for in applications?  What are the 
standards by which the ZC makes its judgments of whether the benefits outweigh 
the costs? 
19. How consistent is the Zoning Commission in denying/accepting projects of the 
same type? 
20. What do developer/applicants most frequently GET out of the PUD designation?  
Is there any one thing that they are most often asking for relief from? 
21. What is the difference between the combined and the 2-step processes? Is there a 
benefit to either type?  Should all PUD applications just be one step? 
22. Public involvement: 
a. How is the public involved in contributing to the process? 
b. Is this effective? 
c. Do they feel that it is effective? 
d. How could it be better? 
23. Is the process efficient? If not, where could it gain efficiency?  What part of the 
process takes longer than it should? 
24. What do citizens think of the process? 
25. What do developers think of the process as a whole? 
26. As a planner, what is the most frustrating part of the process to you? 
27. As a planner, what is the BEST part of the process to you? 
 
Enforcement of plans and proffers/amenities: 
28. What if the developer/applicant wants to make changes to the plan after it has 
been approved by the Commission?   
a. Who follows up to make sure that project is built as designed/approved? 
b. Who monitors compliance? 
29. How difficult is it to enforce the intent of amenity packages? (in cases in which 
developers pay the amenity fee and relinquish control of project thereafter). 
30. As it exists now, applicants can just pay money to a non-profit to provide social 
services, etc. but the money paid cannot be used for administering their program.  
Should rules be changed so that amenity money can be used to ADMINISTER the 
program?  Is there a solution? 
31. Should developers be able to pay in-lieu fees at all, instead of providing on-site 
amenities themselves? 
 
Results/outcome: 
32. Do you feel that the PUD process results in higher quality development than the 
by-right process? 
a. If so, what aspect of the development is better than a matter-of-right? 
33. Do you feel that the process results in development that is in the spirit of the 
comprehensive plan? 
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34. Does the resulting development fit the neighborhood in terms of mass and style? 
35. Is the resulting development “smart growth?” Maximizing transit-orientation, 
reusing existing and under-used properties, supporting transportation options, 
higher density, etc.? 
36. If you could set up the process in whatever way you liked, what would you do? 
37. Is there a need for PUDs in DC? OR could the same ends be accomplished by 
other means? 
38. Do we need PUDs now that we have inclusionary zoning and a green building 
mandate? 
39. Is there anything that I should have asked in this interview, but did not? 
 
 
 
Item 2: A Review of PUD Regulations and Procedures in Comparable Cities 
 
ARLINGTON COUNTY, VA 
In Arlington, most development is done as a special exception, through a site plan review 
process that is very much like PUDs in DC.  Arlington’s regulations are structured so that 
there can be by-right development, but only at a very minimal level.  In order to get more 
desirable levels of height and density, developers must go through the site plan review 
process (Arlington’s version of a PUD).  The available bonuses are quite large: by-right 
development allows only 1.5 FAR and 45 feet of height, whereas a developer can get 
between 3.5 and 10 FAR and 100 to 300 feet of height by going through the site plan 
review process.  The overarching purpose of the site plan review is to allow more 
flexibility in development form, use, and density than would be permitted in by-right 
development in a zoning district.  Any development project is eligible for this special 
exception process. 
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The site plan review process works as follows: 
1) Applicant meets with staff members to understand the process and the unique 
constraints of the proposed site.  Staff encourages applicants to contact 
neighbors and Civic Associations. 
2) Applicant files application (including site plans). 
3) Site plans are reviewed by Departments of Community Planning, Housing and 
Development, Public Works, Parks and Rec, Police, Fire, Environmental 
Services, Econ Development. 
4) Site Plans are reviewed by a committee of the Planning Commission and the 
Site Plan Review Committee (which includes Planning Commission 
Members, Council Advisory Commission members, and Civic Association 
and Neighborhood representatives).  These meetings are INFORMAL and 
they are opportunities for developer to present plans and for community to 
provide comments and direction.  These meetings continue until the SPRC 
believes that the plan is ready to proceed to the Planning Commission. 
5) Planning Commission receives a staff report and a report from SPRC on the 
plan.  These reports include a number of suggested conditions for approval. 
6) Planning Commission reviews site plans and major amendments, in light of 
the staff report and SPRC report, and makes recommendation to the County 
Board. 
7) The County Board meets (at least 90 days after the original application 
submittal) and takes final action on the site plan (accepts or denies).  It can 
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impose specific conditions in the approval of the site plan (ie for parking, 
landscaping, facilities, etc.). 
8) Within 90 days, the applicant is required to provide a detailed final plan (the 
4.1 plan), representing the plan approved by the County Board and including 
the Boards required changes. 
9) If plan is approved, developer can move forward with obtaining permits for 
development, etc. At each stage, zoning and planning offices check the project 
for compliance with the approved plans. 
 
In general, the site plan is approved by the County Board if: 
1) it complies with standards of zoning ordinance 
2) it complies with mix required by GLUP 
3) it provides public improvement features called for by the sector plan 
 
In order to receive the extra height and density allowable through the site plan review 
process, the developer is required to provide an extensive list of amenities to the public.  
For example, the developer is expected to carry out ALL of the necessary public 
improvements to the site, including building or repairing related sidewalks, utilities, 
streetscapes, landscapes, etc.  The developer may also be required to contribute to an 
under-grounding fund, an arts fund, a LEED fund, or other city-managed funds.  In 
addition, if the site has other specific needs, the developer is expected to pay for and 
address those (for example, building a public plaza).  
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One benefit of Arlington’s method: the ordinances do not need to be written very 
specifically, or with great complexity, since nearly every development project goes 
through this discretionary process.  Instead of being cramped by rigid regulations, the 
planning office can more closely its work and its decisions closely on the plans for each 
neighborhood and for the city, and on the specifics of each site. 
 
One major downside of Arlington’s method: it builds a huge and ongoing need for 
inspections.  Every project approved through the process has a number of very specific 
amenities that must be inspected and monitored, and this can be a large challenge for a 
small staff.  
 
 
BALTIMORE, MD 
The City of Baltimore does have PUDs—planned developments of over 2 or 3 
acres in size.  Developers go through the PUD process in order to get permission for land 
uses that are not otherwise permitted in the underlying zoning.  The PUDs cannot get 
additional height and density, although they can shuffle the allowable height and density 
around the site as a whole.  
The Land Use and Urban Design Office (like the Office of Planning) encourages 
applicants to provide amenities like parking or open space, but cannot require these in 
any way.  The benefits of the PUDs are mostly things inherent to the building itself, like 
superior design and superior landscaping. 
Baltimore’s PUD process works as follows: 
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“The first step of the PUD process is creating the master plan, with input from the 
planning department.  That is, we try to create a master plan for a PUD project. That 
includes everything in terms of layout, design, number of dwelling units, square 
footage of each use, parking, etc.  After that informational process, we have our site 
plan review committee look at the master plan. In addition we have the urban design 
and architectural review committee and that is a panel of architects and landscape 
architects that look at projects.  The goal here is to formulate the best master plan that 
we can in terms of building layout, circulation, parking, the whole thing.   
 
Once the master plan has gone through the agency review process, the sort of final 
approval of that master plan process comes from UDARP.  Once that happens, then 
we can move forward with the legislation—because PUDs are legislation.  The 
legislation could be already introduced, or it could be introduced after that master 
plan is finalized.  The legislation is introduced into city council, and once is 
introduced, is referred to various agencies for recommendation.   
 
Then it comes to Planning office for recommendation and there is a whole formal 
process.  Then either the planning office or the applicant will submit to community 
organizations the proposed plans that are coming to the city.  They have to submit to 
the community the same plans that are submitted to the planning office.  We have our 
notification process. We also have the posting of the property requirement—letters to 
community groups, stakeholders, property is posted saying when it will be considered 
by the planning commission. That gets you the master plan. 
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In your master plan you have a series of plats or sheets.  One is your existing 
conditions drawing that shows property of PUD and boundaries and what is there 
now.  Then you have a series of development plans.  One of them is your site plan, 
another is landscape plan, and then depending upon how long your project is you 
might have a series of plans.  You have to include certain info on your development 
plan—for example, that you will have so many dwelling units and so many dwelling 
units that are single family, so many that are multi-family, so much sq. ft of retail, 
office, parking, etc. You also have to do a zoning analysis as to what the zoning code 
requires and what you are proposing and where you are in relationship to underlying 
zoning.  Master plan sort of sets your proposal in terms of what you can do—how 
much res, office, parking, open space, street layout, etc. is all laid out. 
 
Then once you get into your actual plan implementation, depending upon the 
magnitude of your project and how you phase it, each component has to come back 
for final development approval.  You have to come back in for final design approval 
process, for each component of the project.  Site plan review, community information 
process, design panel, and the end product would be a site plan for that component, 
landscaping plan for that component, and all of it would have to be compatible with 
the master-plan.  You could do both steps at once.  
 
Within PUDs, there are two types of changes.  First, there are the minor changes that 
planning commission can consider.  Then there are major changes that have to go 
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back to city council in the form of an ordinance, and planning commission gets to 
decide what is major and what is minor.  In general, minor changes are those that 
involve maybe a site plan tweak or a rearranging of your park and open space a little 
with some other use.  Major amendments are for things like uses that were not 
permitted in the original PUD.  You can be really specific about what uses to permit 
and what you will not.  You can exclude for example a lot of the B1 uses.” (Personal 
interview with Baltimore planner, June 2007).  
 
BOSTON, MA 
The City of Boston has something called Planned Development Areas (PDA), 
which are very similar in purpose and in process to DC’s PUDs.  A PDA is a special 
purpose overlay district, within which special kinds of development can occur, provided 
they are approved through the PDA process.  The BRA (Boston’s version of the Office of 
Planning) must vote on and approve both the zoning map amendment that establishes the 
PDA and the specific development plan/plans for that PDA.  A site must be at least one 
acre to be eligible for designation as a PDA. 
Developers generally go through the PDA process for larger-scale, mixed-use 
developments that may need relief from some of the zoning requirements.  Rather than 
getting a number of separate variances and exceptions that are needed for one, cohesive 
project, developers are able to get them all at once.  The developers also find that earning 
these variances through the PDA process is often more legally bullet-proof than earning 
them separately (it is harder for the community to challenge PDAs, once they have been 
accepted).  Also, in some zones (but not all) developers are able to get extra height and 
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density through PDAs, if they provide amenities and benefits to the communities.  These 
benefits vary from providing affordable housing, open space, and community-gathering 
space, to making contributions to the local library or homeless shelter.  The proffers in 
Boston are usually a combination of things on and off the development site 
Boston’s PDA process works as follows: 
1.  There is a pre-review planning meeting. Applicants are strongly encouraged to 
meet with BRA to discuss matters raised by the PDA Development Plan and the PDA 
Master Plan.  BRA and the applicant identify need for coordination with other BRA 
review and review by other agencies. 
2.  The applicant files its development plan with BRA, with fact sheet describing each 
proposed project in the Development Plan, and a map or description of the area 
involved. 
3.  The BRA publishes notices of receipt of forms. 
4. The public comment period is open for 45 days after BRA has received the 
documents.  These comments include those of public agencies like parks and 
recreation, schools, fire, police, environment, transportation, etc.  These agencies are 
required to submit their opinion of the project. 
5. The BRA shall hold a public hearing, which shall be publicly announced, and the 
public will be able to comment during this meeting. 
6.  No more than 60 days after the BRA has received the PRDA Plan (thus 15 days 
after the public comment period has closed), the BRA shall either: 
A) approve the plan and authorize its Director to petition the ZC to approve  
                   the plan and designate the area as a PDA, or 
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B) conditionally approve the plan, or 
C) disapprove of the plan. 
7. The BRA shall transmit the plan to the ZC for its consideration. 
8.  The ZC publishes notice of the hearing at least 20 days before the hearing. 
9.  The ZC holds a public hearing and votes on the plan.  It shall either approve or 
deny the plan.  If it is approved, then the PDA is considered to be “established.” 
Then no building permit in the PDA shall be given unless it is consistent with the 
Development Plan (or else the plan must be amended). 
 
Boston’s PDAs also must go through large project review (or small-project review if they 
are smaller than the minimum).  The main frustration with PDAs in Boston is the feeling 
that developers are just using them to get a convenient “super-variance,” rather than 
providing a truly superior project with a legitimate planning rationale behind it.  There is 
also the public complaint that the BRA seems to be making special, behind-the-scenes 
deals with developers. 
 
ALEXANDRIA, VA 
Alexandria does not have PUDs, but it does have something called Coordinated 
Development Districts.  These are like district overlays, on very large sites (over 30 
acres).  Each of the city’s 14 different CDDs has different guidelines governing it.  
Within each CDD, a variety of densities can be moved around, in order to make a better 
development project.   
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In order to be approved for a CDD project, most developers proffer things like 
housing, open space, public facilities, landscaping, etc.  The proffer is always something 
that is either integral to the proposed project, is related to mitigating the effects of the 
project, or is a city-wide benefit (such as making a contribution to the city’s tree fund).  
Money is never donated to community groups by developers seeking CDD exceptions. 
The application process for Alexandria’s CDDs is as follows: 
1. The applicant files a concept/bubble plan with department. 
2. The applicant has numerous meetings with developers and 
neighborhood groups, refining plans numerous times before they goes 
to public hearing. 
3. The application then goes before a public hearing of the Planning 
Commission. 
4. The planning office files its report in terms of what we agree on in 
terms of streets, structures etc. and what the office of planning’s 
recommendations are to reject or accept it.   
5. The planning office presents its recommendations for the case, and its 
conditions for support, if applicable. 
6. The developer presents its side of the case. 
7. The commission makes a recommendation to the City Council to 
accept or deny the case. 
8. The case goes before a public hearing of the City Council.  Council 
can accept—but can throw out any conditions that it wants to AND 
can require additional conditions in order to approve it.  Council is the 
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final decision-making body, with the objective of resolving all issues 
before the hearings.  The planning group with them the whole way 
through the process, and the Council has final say on what it should 
look like.  
9. Once the plan is adopted, the developer/owner will file specific plans 
based on that concept. 
 
There are several benefits of this process:  
“The office of planning goes out and makes the presentations to the citizen groups, and 
NOT the developer.  That works well for us.  Our goal is to provide the best project for 
the good of the community.  The community respects this—we just say here is this 
project coming in, and here are the issues we see, and do you have any other inputs to 
raise about this.  At that stage we are not advocating yes or no for the project, we just are 
saying this is what it is—what can you suggest?” 
 
 
 
 
Item 3: A spectrum of PUD proffers (different ways of conceptualizing PUDs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Building should 
be exceptional—
but that is only 
benefit 
All benefits should tie to 
building itself (but do not 
necessarily have to be about 
mitigation) 
Benefits should be concerned 
with mitigating impacts of 
building, onsite or offsite 
Provide benefits onsite or 
offsite- they do not have 
to be related to mitigation 
All benefits are fair 
game, including $ 
contributions 
Benefits should 
just mitigate 
impacts onsite 
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